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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
Kenneth M. Setton, general editor
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES Kenneth M. Setton, general editor
I The First Hundred Years II The Later Crusades, 1189-1311 III The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries IV The Art and Architecture of the Crusader States V The Impact of the Crusades on Islam and Christendom VI An Atlas and Gazetteer of the Crusades
Volume EI
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
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Bertrandon de la Brocquiere offering to Philip the Good of Burgundy a transla- tion of the Koran, at the Abbey of Pothiere during a siege of Mussy-l'Ev6que. From the manuscript Avis direct if pour faire le passage d'Outremer, in the collections of the Bibliotheque nationale
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A HISTORY OF
THE CRUSADES
KENNETH M. SETTON
GENERAL EDITOR
Volume HI
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
EDITED BY
HARRY W. HAZARD
THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN PRESS
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Published 1975 The University of Wisconsin Press Box 1379, Madison, Wisconsin 53701
The University of Wisconsin Press, Ltd. 70 Great Russell St., London
Copyright© 1975 The Regents of the University of Wisconsin System All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America For LC CIP information see the colophon
First printing
ISBN 0-299-06670-3
Dulcem patriam revidere
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CONTENTS
Foreword xiii
Preface xv
A Note on Transliteration and Nomenclature xvii
Abbreviations xxi
I The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century 3
Aziz S. Atiya, The University of Utah II Byzantium and the Crusades, 1261-1354 27 Deno Geanakoplos, Yale University
III Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354-1453 69 Deno Geanakoplos, Yale University
IV The Morea, 1311-1364 104 Peter Topping, The University of Cincinnati
V The Morea, 1364-1460 141 Peter Topping, The University of Cincinnati
VI The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380 167 Kenneth M. Setton, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
VII The Catalans and Florentines in Greece, 1380-1462 225 Kenneth M. Setton, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
VIII The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1306-1421 278 Anthony Luttrell, The Royal University of Malta IX The Hospitallers at Rhodes, 1421-1523 314 Ettore Rossif
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X
CONTENTS
X The Kingdom of Cyprus, 1291-1369
Sir Harry Luke (K.C.M.G.)t XI The Kingdom of Cyprus, 1369-1489
Sir Harry Luke (K.C.M.G.)t XII The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492 Charles Julian Bishko, The University of Virginia
XIII Moslem North Africa, 1049-1394
Harry W. Hazard, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
XIV The Mamluk Sultans, 1 29 1-1 5 1 7 Mustafa M. Ziadaf (The University of Cairo)
XV The Mongols and Western Europe
Denis Sinor, Indiana University XVI The German Crusade on the Baltic
Edgar N. Johnson^ (The University of Nebraska) XVII The Crusades against the Hussites
Frederick G. Heymannf The University of Calgary XVIII The Aftermath of the Crusades
Aziz S. Atiya, The University of Utah
Important Dates and Events Gazetteer and Note on Maps Index
457
486 513 545 586 647
667 677 737
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MAPS
following page
1 Western Europe 1
2 Central Europe 26
3 The Straits and the Aegean 26
4 Frankish Greece 122
5 The Levant in 1300 122
6 The Levant in 1400 170
7 The Levant in 1500 170
8 The Island of Rhodes 338
9 The City of Rhodes 338
10 Cyprus 338
1 1 Spain and Portugal to 1 095 410
1 2 Spain and Portugal, 1 095-1 1 50 434
13 Spain and Portugal, 1 150-1250 434
14 Spain and Portugal, 1250-1350 434
15 Spain and Portugal, 1350-1492 434
16 The Near East 512
1 7 The Mongols in the Thirteenth Century 5 1 2
1 8 The Mongols in the Fifteenth Century 5 1 2
19 The Baltic Littoral and Hinterland 554
20 Bohemia and its Neighbors 646
21 The Eastern Mediterranean 646
Maps compiled by Harry W. Hazard and executed by the Cartographic Laboratory of the University of Wisconsin, Madison
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FOREWORD
Almost twenty years have now passed since the appearance of the first volume of this History of the Crusades (1955). In the Foreword to that volume I cited the maxim attributed to Augustus, which Petrarch once quoted to his friend Boccaccio: Whatever is being done well enough, is being done soon enough (Epp. seniles, XVI [XVII] , 2). Since seven years elapsed before the second volume was published (1962), I have never been under the illusion that we were doing our task soon enough. I can only hope that we have done it well enough. Now, after another dozen years, we present the third volume to our readers, but I am glad to say that the fourth volume has also gone to the press.
Volume III, as its title indicates, deals with the period of the later Crusades. The fourteenth century witnessed the two Smyrniote Cru- sades (1344-1347), the sack of Alexandria (1365), the anti-Bulgarian and anti-Turkish expedition of Amadeo VI of Savoy (1366-1367), the Barbary Crusade (1390), and the Christian defeat at Nicopolis (1396). The fourteenth century closed with the anti-Turkish expedi- tion of the doughty marshal Boucicault in defense of Constantinople (1399-1400), and the following century opened with his harassment of the Mamluk coast of Syria (1403). After Boucicault most Chris- tian expeditions against the Moslems were directed against the Otto- man Turks; they were primarily defensive, to stem the Turkish advance into Christian territory.
The hope of rewinning the Holy Land had largely passed by the fifteenth century, although it remained the ideal of propagandists at the Curia Romana. The fall of Constantinople in 1453 was a blow to eastern Christendom from which recovery was to prove impossible. Pius H's crusading efforts died with him at Ancona (1464), and little came of the crusading dreams of visionaries at the court of Burgundy in the time of Philip the Good (1419-1467). The Conciliar move- ment had distracted the papacy; the anti-Hussite Crusades helped spend the military resources of the Germans. Nevertheless, the fif- teenth century was marked by the Hungarian expeditions which John Hunyadi and Matthias Corvinus led against the Turks. If the Christians were defeated at Varna (1444), they repulsed the Turks at Belgrade (1456). If the Mamluks reduced Cyprus to a tributary state
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FOREWORD
with the humiliation of king James (1426), the Venetians later acquired the island and held it for more than eighty years (1489- 1571). Early in the sixteenth century Selim Fs destruction of the Mamluk power in Egypt (1517) made the Turks masters of the eastern Mediterranean littoral. The Hospitallers had to surrender Rhodes on the first day of the new year 1523, but Malta held out against the Turks in 1565, and the naval forces of Christendom were victorious at Lepanto in 1571.
Although Dr. Hazard and I had once hoped to carry the Crusades down to the Venetian surrender of Crete to the Turks in 1669, time and circumstance have moderated our ambition. Our plans have changed somewhat-inevitably so-in the twenty years that have passed since the appearance of the first volume. Volume IV will deal primarily with the art and architecture of the crusader states; Vol- ume V, with political and economic institutions, agricultural condi- tions, crusading propaganda, western missions, religious minorities, and social history. Volume VI will be an atlas and gazetteer of crusading history.
KENNETH M. SETTON
The Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, New Jersey October 10, 1974
PREFACE
Having devoted nearly a quarter of a century to this series of volumes on the crusades, and having known for at least a decade that eventually this preface would be required of me, I nevertheless have accumulated no philosophical profundities to share with the reader, merely some deeply felt apologies and regrets, gratitude and hopes.
Apologies for the inordinate delays in producing this and its companion volume, now in press, are due both to the readers who have-we trust-been impatiently awaiting their appearance, and to the contributors, many of whom have conscientiously revised chap- ters submitted in the 'fifties and 'sixties to take into account subse- quent research. Regrets parallel the apologies, for the inexorable passage of time has claimed the lives of four of our contributors- Sir Harry Luke and Professors Ettore Rossi, Mustafa Ziada, and Edgar Johnson -so that we have had to prepare their chapters for publica- tion without the benefit of their advice, in rueful awareness that we could never duplicate their specialized knowledge. I can only hope that such footnotes and bibliographical additions as I have supplied, and such modifications as I have had to make in their original manuscripts, would have met with their approval.
Gratitude, of course, is due primarily to our other contributors, not only for revising their chapters but for their forbearance with editorial exigencies and suggestions. Many others have helped, over the years, and our deep appreciation is here acknowledged, to Mrs. Jean T. Carver for extensive impeccable typing, to Mrs. Margaret T. Setton and Dr. David L. Gassman for meticulous proof-reading, to Mrs. Mary Maraniss of the University of Wisconsin Press for equally meticulous preparation of the manuscript for the printer, to Profes- sor Randall T. Sale and his staff for the maps which embellish these pages, to the anonymous printers who have cheerfully incorporated countless revisions and corrections, and not least to the ever-helpful director of the Press, Thompson Webb, Jr.
As for our hopes, without which the effort of assembling and editing such collaborative works as this would be intolerable, they will surprise no one: the hope that this third volume is as generously received as its two predecessors, and stands up as well over the years; the hope that volume IV will appear shortly, and that volumes V and
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PREFACE
VI will follow with all deliberate speed; the hope that perusal of the series will prove profitable, not only in supplying information pre- sented from varied points of view, but in providing occasion for contemplation of a world in upheaval, so different from our own and yet so inescapably similar.
Harry W. Hazard
The Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, New Jersey October 25, 1974
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NOMENCLATURE
One of the obvious problems to be solved by the editors of such a work as this, intended both for general readers and for scholars in many different disciplines, is how to render the names of persons and places, and a few other terms, originating in languages and scripts unfamiliar to the English-speaking reader and, indeed, to most read- ers whose native languages are European. In the present volume, and presumably in the entire work, these comprise principally Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Armenian, none of which was normally written in our Latin alphabet until its adoption by Turkey in 1928. The analogous problem of Byzantine Greek names and terms has been handled by using the familiar Latin equivalents, Anglicized Greek, or, occasionally, Greek type, as has seemed appropriate in each instance, but a broader approach is desirable for the other languages under consideration.
The somewhat contradictory criteria applied are ease of recogni- tion and readability on the one hand and scientific accuracy and consistency on the other. It has proved possible to reconcile these, and to standardize the great variety of forms in which identical names have been submitted to us by different contributors, through constant consultation with specialists in each language, research in the sources, and adherence to systems conforming to the require- ments of each language.
Of these, Arabic presents the fewest difficulties, since the script in which it is written is admirably suited to the classical language. The basic system used, with minor variants, by all English-speaking schol- ars was restudied and found entirely satisfactory, with the slight modifications noted. The chief alternative system, in which every Arabic consonant is represented by a single Latin character (t for th, b for kh, d for dh, s for sh, g for gh) was rejected for several reasons, needless proliferation of diacritical marks to bother the eye and
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NOMENCLATURE
multiply occasions for error, absence of strong countervailing argu- ments, and, most decisively, the natural tendency of non-specialists to adopt these spellings but omit the diacritical marks. The use of single letters in this manner leads to undesirable results, but the spellings adopted for the present work may be thus treated with confidence by any writer not requiring the discriminations which the remaining diacritical marks indicate.
The letters used for Arabic consonants, in the order of the Arabic alphabet, are these: \ b, t, th, j, h, kh, d, dh, r, z, s, sh, 5, <J, t, z, \ gh, f, q, k, 1, m, n, h, w, y. The vowels are a, i, u, lengthened as a, i, u, with the alif bi-surati-1-ya* distinguished as a; initial ' is omitted, but terminal macrons are retained. Diphthongs are au and al, not aw and ayf as being both philologically preferable and visually less mislead- ing. The same considerations lead to the omission of / of 0/- before a duplicated consonant (Nur-ad-DIn rather than Nur-al-Din). As in this example, hyphens are used to link words composing a single name (as also 'Abd-Allah), with weak initial vowels elided (as Abu-l-Hasan). Normally al- (meaning "the") is not capitalized; ibn- is not when it means literally "son of," but is otherwise (as Ibn-Khaldun).
Some readers may be disconcerted to find the prophet called "Mohammed" and his followers "Moslems," but this can readily be justified. These spellings are valid English proper names, derived from Arabic originals which would be correctly transliterated "Muham- mad" and "Muslimun" or "Muslimin." The best criterion for decid- ing whether to use the Anglicized spellings or the accurate translitera- tions is the treatment accorded the third of this cluster of names, that of the religion "Islam." Where this is transliterated "Islam," with a macron over the a, it should be accompanied by "Muslim" and "Muhammad," but where the macron is omitted, consistency and common sense require "Moslem" and "Mohammed," and it is the latter triad which have been considered appropriate in this work. All namesakes of the prophet, however, have had their names duly transliterated "Muhammad," to correspond with names of other Arabs who are not individually so familiar to westerners as to be better recognized in Anglicized forms.
All names of other Arabs, and of non-Arabs with Arabic names, have been systematically transliterated, with the single exception of §alah-ad-DIn, whom it would have been pedantic to call that rather than Saladin. For places held, in the crusading era or now, by Arabs, the Arabic names appear either in the text or in the gazetteer, where some additional ones are also included to broaden the usefulness of this feature.
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NOMENCLATURE
xix
Large numbers of names of persons and groups, however, custom- arily found in Arabicized spellings because they were written in Arabic script, have been restored to their underlying identity when- ever this is ascertainable. For example, Arabic "Saljuq" misrepresents four of the six component phonemes: s is correct, a replaces Turkish e, for which Arabic script provides no equivalent, / is correct, / replaces the non- Arabic chf u substitutes a non-Turkish long u for the original w, and q as distinguished from k is non-existent in Turkish; this quadruple rectification yields "Selchuk" as the name of the eponymous leader, and "Selchiikid"-on the model of 'Abbasid and Timurid-for the dynasty and the people.
It might be thought that as Turkish is now Written in a well- conceived modified Latin alphabet, there would be no reason to alter this, and this presumption is substantially valid. For the same reasons as apply to Arabic, ch has been preferred above q , sh above $ , and gh above g, with kh in a few instances given as a preferred alternate of hf from which it is not distinguished in modern Turkish. No long vowels have been indicated, as being functionless survivals. Two other changes have been made in the interest of the English-speaking reader, and should be remembered by those using map sheets and standard reference works: c (pronounced dj) has been changed to /, so that one is not visually led to imagine that the Turkish name for the Tigris-Dijle/Dicle-rhymes with "tickle," and what the eminent lexicographer H. C. Hony terms "that abomination the undotted 1" has, after the model of The Encyclopaedia of Islam, been written i.
Spellings, modified as above indicated, have usually been founded on those of the Turkish edition, Islam Ansiklopedisi, hampered by occasional inconsistencies within that work. All names of Turks appear thus emended, and Turkish equivalents of almost all places within or near modern Turkey appear in the gazetteer.
In addition to kh, Middle Turkish utilized a few other phonemes not common in modern Turkish: zh (modern /), dh, ng, and a (modern e); the first three of these will be used as needed, while the last-mentioned may be assumed to underlie every medieval Turkish name now spelled with e. Plaintive eyebrows may be raised at our exclusion of q, but this was in Middle Turkish only the alternate spelling used when the sound k was combined with back instead of front vowels, and its elimination by the Turks is commendable.
Persian names have been transliterated like Arabic with certain modifications, chiefly use of the additional vowels e and o and replacing d and dh with ? and z, so that Arabic "Adharbaijan" becomes Persian "Azerbaijan," more accurate as well as more recog-
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND NOMENCLATURE
nizable. Omission of the definite article from personal names was considered but eventually disapproved.
Armenian presented great difficulties: the absence of an authorita- tive reference source for spelling names, the lack of agreement on transliteration, and the sound-shift by which classical and eastern Armenian bt dt g became western Armenian p, t, k and— incredible as it may seem to the unwary— vice versa; similar reciprocal interchanges involved ts and dz, and ch and /. The following alphabet represents western Armenian letters, with eastern variants in parentheses: a, p (b), k (g), t (d), e, z, e, i, t, zh, i, 1, kh, dz (ts), g (k), h, ts (dz), ghj (ch), m, y, n, sh, o, ch, b (p), ch (j), r, s, y, d (t), r, ts, u or v, f>, k, o, f. Many spellings are based on the Armenian texts in the Recueil des historiens des croisades.
In standardizing names of groups, the correct root forms in the respective languages have been identified, with the ending "-id" for dynasties and their peoples but "-ite" for sects, and with plural either identical with singular (as Kirghiz) or plus "-s" (Khazars) or "-es" (Uzes). In cases where this sounded hopelessly awkward, it was abandoned (Muwahhids, not Muwahhidids or Muwahfridites, and certainly not Almohads, which is, however, cross-referenced).
The use of place names is explained in the note preceding the gazetteer, but may be summarized by saying that in general the most familiar correct form is used in the text and maps, normally an English version of the name by which the place was known to Europeans during the crusades. Variant forms are given and identi- fied in the gazetteer.
Despite conscientious efforts to perfect the nomenclature, errors will probably be detected by specialists; they are to be blamed on me and not on individual contributors or editorial colleagues, for I have been accorded a free hand. Justifiable suggestions for improvements will be welcomed, and used to bring succeeding volumes nearer that elusive goal, impeccability in nomenclature.
Harry W. Hazard
[Princeton, New Jersey, 19621
Reprinted from Volume I, with minor modifications.
ABBREVIATIONS
AOL Archives de VOrient latin, 2 vols., Societe de l'Orient latin, Paris, 1881-1884.
CSHB Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae, ed. B. G. Niebuhr, I. Becker,
and others, 50 vols., Bonn, 1828-1897. Dipl. Diplomatari de VOrient catala, ed. Antoni Rubio i Lluch, Barcelona,
Malta Royal Malta Library, Archives of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. MGH, SS. Monumenta Germaniae historical Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, T.
Mommsen, and others, 32 vols., Reichsinstitut fllr aitere deutsche Geschichts-
kunde, Hanover and elsewhere, 1826-1934. PG Patrologiae graecae cursus completus . . . , ed. J. P. Migne, 167 vols., Paris,
1857-1876.
PL Patrologiae latinae cursus completus . . . , ed. J. P. Migne, 221 vols., Paris, 1841-1864.
RHC, Arm. Recueil des historiens des croisades: Documents armeniens, ed.
E. Dulaurier and others, 2 vols., Academie des inscriptions et belles-lettres,
Paris, 1869-1906, reprinted 1967. RHE Revue d' histoire ecclesiastique, Louvain, 1900-date. RHGF Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. Martin Bouquet
[1685-1754] and others, 24 vols, in fol., Academie des inscriptions et
belles-lettres, Paris, 1738-1904. RISS Rerum italicarum scriptores . . . , ed. L. A. Muratori [1672-1750], 25
vols, in 28, Milan, 1723-1751; new edition by G. Carducci and V. Fiorini,
34 vols, in 109 fasc, Citta di Castello and Bologna, 1900-1935. ROL Revue de VOrient latin, 12 vols., Societe de l'Orient latin, Paris,
1893-1911.
RTA Deutsche Reichstagsakten, vols. 8—9, Akademie der Wissenschaften,
Munich, 1867-1868, reprinted Gbttingen. U.B. Urkundliche Beitrage zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges . . . , ed. Fran-
tisek Palacky, 2 vols., Prague, 1873, reprinted Osnabruck, 1966.
1947.
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THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
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I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
JL he historiography of the crusades has undergone considerable emendation in recent times, and many accepted ideas have had to be revised. One of the most notable among these altered conceptions is that of the limits of the Age of the Crusades. The older historians considered the crusades as a movement coterminous with the life of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, at least in regard to the closing date of this tragic confrontation between two large sections of medieval humanity. According to the old school of thought, the crusades suddenly began in 1095 with Urban H's famous declarations at Clermont in Auvergne, and ended equally suddenly in 1291 with the termination of Latin dominion in the Holy Land when Acre and the remaining Christian outposts fell into the hands of the Bafrri Mamluk sultan al-Ashraf Khalll. 1 This is the cataclysmic viewpoint of the Age of the Crusades, which has-been repudiated in the light of modern researches in this field.
Here we are concerned only with the closing chapters in the history of the movement, and this volume will, it is hoped, show beyond doubt that the fall of Acre did not spell the end of the crusades. When the last vestiges of the Latin kingdom in Palestine disappeared before the irresistible advance of Islamic forces, its crown was transferred to the Lusignan dynasty in Cyprus,2 and the Hospitallers, who had been its staunch defenders, moved the center of their crusading activities from Syria to the island of Rhodes,3 which they wrested from Byzantium after a short sojourn in Cyprus.
The deadly blow which the Christians had sustained at Acre seems to have awakened western Christendom to the stark reality of their precarious position in the Levant. To the contemporary mind, the collapse of Acre in 1291 was comparable to Saladin's storming of
1. See volume II of this work, pp. 595-598, 754.
2. See below, chapter X.
3. See below, chapter VIII.
4
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
Jerusalem in 1187. Toward the end of the thirteenth century, the crusading spirit had been slumbering throughout Europe. Now the time was ripe for action, but the calamities and humiliations which had befallen the Christian hosts in the past indicated the need for better organization and a greater measure of harmony in the future. Thus the crusade in the fourteenth century passed through two distinct stages. The first was that of propaganda, consisting mainly of literary works by numerous thinkers and pious travelers who planned the passagium and advised the leaders on the elements of a successful campaign. The second comprised positive action in a series of expedi- tions conducted against the Moslem states in the Near East. The first phase occupied roughly the first half of the century, while the second followed as a natural corollary to propagandist efforts on behalf of the crusading cause. In a number of cases we find that propagandists also took part in some of the memorable crusading campaigns of the later Middle Ages.
In regard to the crusading terrain, the fourteenth century pre- sented a broader arena. In 1096, when Godfrey of Bouillon em- barked with the blessing of pope Urban II on his momentous journey to the Near East, the medieval world was still very limited in dimensions. Beyond the confines of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, if we except certain areas on the western shores of India, the rest of the globe was enveloped in the thick mist of oblivion.4 It was not until the age of the later crusades that the clouds began to lift and the imagination came to perceive the alien regions of Central Asia and the Far East. This immense growth in the size of the known world was, in part, a by-product of the later crusades. Even though the movement lacked the full vigor and the spectacular achievements of the early crusades, its later history brought forth results of a more enduring value for mankind. It is true that the traditional scene of action remained as before in the Levant, and the eyes of all Chris- tians remained fixed on the land of promise, but the crusading mind traveled much farther into limitless Cathay with the adventurers and missionaries who opened up the eastern route to Khanbaliq ("Cam- baluc," Peking) in the heart of Asia. The idea of collaboration with the Mongols, who had become a growing factor in world politics and who shared with the Christians an abhorrence for the Moslem Mam- luks, was regarded as basic to the foreign policy of the papacy and its
4. For a full discussion, see John Kirtland Wright, The Geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades (New York, 1925), and a more recent work by I. de Rachewiltz, Papal Envoys to the Great Khans (Stanford, 1971).
Ch.I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
5
associates in western Europe, and was reiterated by the propagandists for the crusade in the later medieval period.5
Thus the field of crusading activities during the fourteenth cen- tury included not only Europe and the Levant but also the Mongol world with its sweeping vistas far beyond the frontiers of the Near East. Though the face of the Respublica Christiana in Europe was changing, and crusading ideas were being submerged in the tumult which accompanied the rise of the new nations and the continuous decline of the old order, certain events helped to resuscitate the moribund cause throughout the decades under review. The fall of Acre in 1291, like the loss of Jerusalem in 1 187 and the collapse of Constantinople in 1453, brought home to Christians in Europe a feeling of dismay and aroused in them a spirit of defensive, if not offensive, crusading. The occasional presence of wandering kings from the Near Eastern Christian states served their western coreli- gionists in Europe as another reminder of the sad fate of fellow Christians beyond the sea. The western peregrinations of Peter I de Lusignan (whom Philip of M6zi6res described as the athleta Christi) between 1362 and 1365 preceded the sack of Alexandria in the latter year. King Leon VI of Cilician Armenia spent his closing days as a refugee in Europe until he died in Paris in November 1393, hardly three years before the crusade of Nicopolis. It was after the rout of the united forces of Europe outside the walls of Nicopolis that emperor Manuel II Palaeologus undertook his "mendicant pilgrim- age" to the west between 1399 and 1401, in order to persuade the pope and the kings of France and England to send military aid for the relief of his beleaguered city of Constantinople.6 Even after the downfall of Byzantium and the flight of the Palaeologi to the Morea, an imperial pretender, Thomas Palaeologus, would take refuge in Rome in 1461. By then, however, the opportunity for major crusad- ing conquests would be gone beyond recall.
During the fourteenth century, propagandists for holy war in- cluded even more potent elements than the solitary royal figures from the Near East who moved from court to court in Europe without any direct contact with the people of western Christendom. The innumerable wandering knights of the dislocated military-reli- gious orders and the dwindling Latin principalities in the Levant did much to renew the crusading zeal which, though weakening, had
5. Sec below, chapter XV.
6. See below, chapter III.
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never been extinguished. Men of the sword and men of the pen together with a stream of pilgrims returning from Jerusalem helped to rekindle enthusiasm for the cause by word of mouth and by the written letter. Indeed, it would be idle to attempt to make a full list of the late medieval propagandists and to outline their life and work. The fourteenth century in particular is marked by an avalanche of literary propaganda covering almost all the countries of Europe.
That propaganda was inaugurated by an eye-witness of the fight- ing which had taken place within Acre in 1291, one Thaddeus of Naples. He wrote a tract of considerable interest under the title of Hystoria de desolacione . . . tocius Terre Sancte ... 7 shortly after he had been forced out of Acre with the rest of its Christian inhabitants. He describes himself as "Magister Neapolitanus" and presents his work in the form of an Epistola addressed to the whole of Christen- dom. He describes the siege and the storming of the city in a style designed to arouse the feelings of all Catholics for the revival of the crusading movement against the enemies of the cross. He exhorts all the princes of Europe to abstain from their local squabbles and join their forces and efforts into one united body under the leadership of the church militant in order to save the Holy Land, which he calls "our heritage."
Thaddeus was a contemporary of pope Nicholas IV (1288-1292), whose pontificate was an important landmark in the history of propaganda for the crusade. Nicholas grouped around himself at the Roman curia a number of men devoted to the cause, two of whom are worthy of special mention. Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples, who had inherited his father's claim to the crown of the kingdom of Jerusalem, was naturally interested in the affairs of the east; he was also a papal vassal and as such collaborated with Nicholas IV in his project of a passagium generate. The second advisor to Nicholas was a Franciscan friar named Fidenzio of Padua, who had just returned from a special mission to the east before the Moslem conquest of Acre. He drew up his recommendations in his Liber recuperationis Terre Sancte. 8 He favors a maritime blockade of the Mamluk empire, and he states that certain points on the coast of Cilician Armenia would provide a fine base for military operations against Syria and Palestine. His book deals with the routes as well as with numerous details concerning the fleet and the land forces and other items of interest to the pilgrim and the crusader. Perhaps the most vulnerable
7. Ed. Paul Riant (Geneva, [1873]).
8. Ed. G. Golubovich, Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e deW Oriente francescano, 1st ser., II (Quaracchi, 1913), 1-60.
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point in his memorandum is that he wrote it when Acre was still in Christian hands, and so considerable modification had to be intro- duced in his plans to cope with the new situation. On the whole, the reign of Nicholas IV witnessed the birth of an epoch of intense literary and diplomatic propaganda for the crusade.
During the same period, a new departure in propagandist literature appeared in the work of Raymond Lull, a Catalan born in 1232. A poet, a philosopher, and a prolific author of several hundred books and treatises of the most varied nature, Lull was also one of the most active figures of his time. Like Roger Bacon, he was one of the early pioneers of the principle of the unity of human knowledge, which he exemplified in his Arbor scientiae. Like Frederick II, he was one of the earliest orientalists, mastering the Arabic tongue and even com- posing Arabic poetry; and like him, too, he was a crusader who believed in the ways of peace rather than the ways of war for a permanent settlement of the causes of difference between east and west. Whereas Frederick II resorted to diplomacy, Raymond Lull became the great exponent of religious missionary work among the followers of Mohammed. It is here that Lull's real contribution rests, though he was not without a precursor in this field. Around the middle of the twelfth century, Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, after a visitation tour of the Cluniac houses in the Iberian peninsula which brought him into direct contact with Moslems, had formulated a new thesis for relations with the enemies of the cross. His treatise, entitled Contra sectam Saracenorum,9 makes it clear that he wished Christians to approach Moslems "not with arms as the crusaders do, but with reason, not with hatred but with love," for, in so doing, they might win them over to Christ and save their souls from perdition. His work was a counterfoil to that of his great contempo- rary, Bernard of Clairvaux, whose vehement appeal to arms is found in his treatise De laude novae militiae. 10
Peter paved the way for Raymond Lull, the great apostle of missionary work among Moslems. Though he did, like most of the authors of his time, start by promoting a new plan for a crusade, in the Liber de fine,11 which he wrote at an early stage in his career, Lull afterward gave up this plan and embraced the idea of converting Moslems to Christianity, instead of destroying their bodies and the
9. In Migne, PL, CLXXXIX, as ** Ad versus sectam sive haeresim Saracenorum," and trans. J. Thom'a, Zwei B'ucher gegen den Muhammedanismus (Leipzig, 1906). On Peter, see James Kritzeck, Peter the Venerable and Islam (Princeton, 1964).
10. In Migne, PL, CLXXXII-CLXXXV; also several other editions and translations.
11. Ed. A. Gottron in Ramon Lulls Kreuzzugsideen (Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte, vol. XXXIX; Berlin, 1912).
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souls therewith. In order to achieve his aim, he bought a Moorish slave who was a good enough scholar to teach him Arabic and thus enable him to preach the Christian doctrine and attempt to refute Islam in the countries beyond the sea. Thrice he crossed the western Mediterranean to the sultanate of Tunisia, where he engaged himself in perilous discussions with the shaikhs of Islam. During his first and second trips, he was able to formulate the terms of his debate with them in his treatise called Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni,12 but he was deported by the lenient Moslem governor after a period of captivity. In his third crossing, after a relatively peaceful stay among the Moslems of Tunis, he sallied into Bugia on the Algerian coast, where he earned his much desired crown of martyrdom. At the age of eighty-three, in the year 1315 or 1316, he stood in the middle of the town market to preach his faith, but the fury of the fanatic Berbers led them to stone him to death on the beach, where his body was picked up by a Genoese ship and taken for interment in the cathedral of Palma on the island of Majorca.
Contemporary with the movements identified with Nicholas IV on the one hand and Raymond Lull on the other, there arose a royal center of propaganda at the court of Philip IV the Fair, king of France (1285-1314). Philip's reign was one of great moment in the annals of France, of the papacy, and of Europe in general. He had visions of amalgamating France and the empire under his own sover- eignty. He disgraced Boniface VIII and succeeded in drawing the papacy to France, at Avignon, with immeasurable consequences. He even dreamt of the creation of a new eastern empire, including Byzantium together with the Holy Land and the whole of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt, under the rule of one of his sons. Such visions of world hegemony in the age of the crusades were bound to direct the king's attention to the possibilities accruing from the leadership of the movement of holy war. The crusade, which was a basic element in papal foreign policy, eventually became one of the chief factors in the effort to impose the supremacy of the Roman see over Europe. Thus Philip undoubtedly wanted to follow the example of the pontiff and, by espousing the international cause, place himself at the head of the Christian commonwealth. His advisors and courtiers naturally echoed the royal aspirations in their propagandist writings. They included two great jurists, Peter Dubois and William of Nogaret, as well as four men of action -Jacques de Molay, grand master of the Templars, Fulk of Villaret, master of the Hospitallers,
12. Ed. I. Salzinger, Opera omnia, 10 vols. (Mainz, 1721-1740), IV; cf. A. Gottron, L'Edicid maguntina de Ramdn Lull (Barcelona, 1915).
Digitized by
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Henry II de Lusignan, king of Cyprus, and Benedict Zaccaria, Geno- ese admiral.
The work which best represents the ideas and policies prevailing at Philip's court is Peter Dubois's treatise entitled De recuperatione Terre Sancte,13 which he wrote under the auspices of the French king and dedicated in 1307 to Edward I of England, known for his crusading enthusiasm. Dubois's treatise is one of the most remarkable documents of its kind produced during this period. Written by a man of law, it deals systematically with all the contemporary problems arising from the projects of crusade and offers all the solutions in line with the royal policy. Dissensions in Europe should be completely eradicated, and the unwilling states brought to reason by force. Discords must be submitted for final settlement by a European tribunal of arbitration composed of three ecclesiastical dignitaries and three laymen known to be inaccessible to corruption. Trade with the recalcitrant members of European society should be banned, and their citizens transported to colonize Palestine. The right of appeal to the pope should remain, but the papacy, according to his conception, must be deprived of its independence and dispossessed of its landed heritage. The popes must be settled in France, and the whole of the church' hierarchy should return to the life of poverty exemplified in its early history. The administration of church fiefs should be en- trusted to the king of France, and the revenues of the Templars and Hospitallers should be confiscated and used for financing the cru- sade. In fact, these two orders should be united into a single orga- nization whose sole business would be crusading. The routes to the east could be selected according to the position and exigencies of each country. The empire must adopt a hereditary regime with a French prince on its throne. The government of the Holy Land, after its reconquest, should be arranged on a military basis with a dux belli and a body of centurions and cohorts of twelve warriors in every town. Each state should have its special hostels prepared for the reception and accommodation of its own subjects. The eastern Chris- tians and all heretical sects must be persuaded to join the Roman church. Missionary work should be undertaken by competent per- sons conversant with the languages of the Orient. The priories of the Templars and Hospitallers should be utilized for the institution of schools where these languages would be taught. The crown of Egypt and "Babylon" would be conferred upon Philip's second son, Philip
13. Ed. C. V. Langlois (Collection de textes pour servir a l'dtude et Tenseignement dTiistoire, IX; Paris, 1891); trans. W. I. Brandt, The Recovery of the Holy Land (Columbia University Records of Civilization, no. 51, New York, 1956).
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(V), who would organize an eastern empire with French leanings. This curious medley of ideas, both feasible and unfeasible, provides the keynotes to the project formulated by Peter Dubois under the auspices of a royal master to whom the crusade appears to have been a means rather than an end in itself.
Perhaps the most practical propositions were those which came from a Latin resident in the Levant, Marino Sanudo Torsello, who was related to an important Venetian dynasty settled in the Archipel- ago. He wrote a monumental work which he called Liber secretorum fidelium cruris;1* he submitted its first redaction to pope Gement V in 1309 and the second to king Charles IV of France in 1323. As one who had traveled far and wide in the Levant, he had managed to collect more data and original material about the countries of that part of the world than any of his Latin contemporaries. His concep- tion of a successful crusade is based on economic principles above all other considerations. The chief source of Mamluk superiority is trade. The western maritime powers send their ships to the trade emporia of Egypt and Syria for the purchase of goods imported from India and the Far East. By this means they enrich the sultans with Christian money which they employ in fighting the Christians in Palestine. Furthermore, some of the Christian states themselves per- fidiously supply the enemy with war material from European mar- kets and with slaves from Kaffa and elsewhere, destined to feed the Mamluk ranks with warriors. Past experience has taught Christians the hopelessness of depending solely on armed expeditions for the recovery of the Holy Land. In order to defeat the Mamluks, the Christians must first drain their foes' economic resources and stop their slave trade with the Tatars. Therefore, a general ban on trade with the Islamic states in the Near East should be declared by the papacy on pain of excommunication and interdict. Next, a maritime blockade should be enforced on the Moslem shores of Egypt and Syria. Special galleys should stand by to guard the waters of the Levant against intrusion and intercept any Moslem craft attempting to reach the western world. If this blockade were rigorously sus- tained over a period of three years, the Mamluk sultans would be completely crippled, and their resources of men and material dried up. It is only then that the Christians might conduct their crusade with assured success for the recapture and retention of the Holy Land.
In reality, the examples mentioned represent only a fraction of
14. Ed. J. Bongars in Gesta dei per Francos. . . (2 vols, in 1, Hanover, 1611); partial trans, by A. Stewart for Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society (London, 1896).
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the vast propagandist literature originating from the pens of theo- rists, ideologists, and pilgrims of various nations in the west during the fourteenth century. In the meantime, the idea of an alliance with the Mongols for joint action against Islam, formulated in the age of Innocent IV (1243-1254) and Louis IX (1226-1270), continued to haunt the imagination of western potentates even after the decline of the crusade. During this period the most striking efforts to convert the Mongols to Christianity are exemplified by the heroic careers of John of Monte Corvino and his worthy contemporary Odoric of Pordenone, whose lives and activities are landmarks in Far Eastern missionary history. Settled at Khanbaliq after extensive peregrina- tions in Asia, John of Monte Corvino became the original founder of the Catholic church in Cathay. He might have passed unnoticed by the west had one of his letters not accidentally reached pope Clem- ent V. In 1304, he is said to have baptized five thousand souls at what is now Peking, and built two churches. He may have translated the New Testament and the Psalter into the Mongol language, which he had mastered, though this remains to be proved. It was probably in the second decade of the century that Odoric joined him at Khanbaliq after one of the longest journeys on record in the Middle Ages. Odoric took the route to China by way of Constantinople, Tabriz, Baghdad, Hormuz, then by sea to Malabar, Ceylon, and Madras, whence he attained Sumatra and Java in the East Indies, finally reaching Zaitun (probably Tsinkiang) and Khanbaliq. He returned to Avignon in 1330 completely exhausted, to die at Udine in the following year. In the meantime John, who had been elected bishop of Sultaniyeh and the Far East, had died in 1328. When James of Florence was murdered at an unknown place in the heart of China in 1 362, it may be said that Catholic Christianity had come to an end in those remote regions, though the idea of joint action with the Mongols never died, but lay dormant in the western mind until Christopher Columbus revived it by his westward journey to India, only to discover the New World and give history a new orienta- tion.15
While the propagandists were busy stirring up the medieval mind for the crusade, a number of leading men decided to take positive action. Thus a series of minor preludes led the way to the greater campaigns of the second half of the fourteenth century. Apart from some abortive attempts against the Byzantine empire, the first expe- dition to come within the category of holy warfare at this time was
15. See below, chapters XV and XVIII.
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the Aegean crusade, which resulted in the capture of Smyrna in 1344. 16 After prolonged negotiations between the Roman see and Venice, pope Clement VI in a memorandum dated August 1343 proclaimed the formation of a Holy League to suppress Turkish aggression. The constituent members of the League agreed among themselves on raising a fleet of twenty galleys to intercept Turkish movements in the Archipelago; Venice was ready to provide six, the pope four, king Hugh IV of Cyprus four, and the Hospitallers six. Clement VI finally nominated Henry of Asti, the Latin patriarch of Constantinople, as head of the coalition fleet and Martin Zaccaria, the Genoese former lord of Chios, as commander of his naval squadron. Venice appointed Peter Zeno admiral of the Venetian galleys. They met at Negroponte and were joined by the remaining ships from Cyprus and Rhodes, now the seat of the Hospitallers, under their master Helion of Villeneuve. The joint fleet then sailed toward Anatolia and took the city of Smyrna by surprise, though the citadel was held by Umur Pasha, emir of Aydin. Their armies made a triumphant entry into the city on October 28, 1344. It would remain in the hands of the Christians until the whole of Asia Minor was seized by the invincible hordes of Timur after the battle of Ankara in 1402.
The crusade of Humbert II of Viennois was the natural continua- tion to the success of the Holy League in the Aegean. Meager as it may seem, the capture of Smyrna was hailed by the pontiff as the beginning of the end of the sorrows and humiliation of the Latins in the Near East. Processions were ordained to commemorate the victo- ry in the streets of Avignon. The pope urged the kings of England and France, Edward III Plantagenet and Philip VI of Valois, to desist from the Hundred Years' War and unite their forces against their common enemy. He wrote the doge of Venice a congratulatory message to induce him to persist in his struggle against the Turks. In brief, western Europe seemed astir, and another Godfrey of Bouillon was expected to emerge on the scene of events and lead the Christian hosts to a crushing victory over the forces of Islam.
It was at this moment that Humbert II, dauphin of Viennois, a very unhappy man, took to the idea of the crusade. The death of his only son and heir had left him inconsolable, and he had resolved to drown his grief in fighting the Moors in Spain and to atone for his past disaffection with ecclesiastics by serving the Roman see. As soon as the news of the fall of Smyrna reached the west in December
16. See Paul Lemerle, L'tmirat d 'Aydin, Byzance et Voccident (Bibliotheque byzantine, Etudes, II; Paris, 1957), pp. 180-203, and cf. below, pp. 294-295.
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1344, he decided to deflect his project from Spain and continue the Aegean campaign under the auspices of the pope. After renouncing his feudal rights over the Dauphin6, which would ultimately go to the French crown, he offered to equip five galleys with twelve bannerets, three hundred knights, and a thousand arbalesters. In return, he requested that the pope grant him the high command of the crusade, allow him the proceeds of the usual tithes, and recognize his suzerainty over all the conquered territories. With some reluc- tance, Clement VI and his cardinals approved these terms on condi- tion that Humbert should remain in the east for three years with some hundred men-at-arms. Finally the "Captain-General of the Crusade against the Turks and the Unfaithful to the Holy Church of Rome," as Humbert was styled, sailed from Marseilles in September 1345 and disembarked at Genoa, to cross Lombardy to Venice and, after weeks of negotiation, resume his voyage. He was urged by the pope to proceed, if possible, to the Genoese colony of Kaffa across the Black Sea, and to help in its relief from the Tatars, who were besieging the whole of the Crimea.
When Humbert reached the Aegean, he allowed himself to become involved in the futile diplomatic and military broils of the Genoese with the members of the League and the Latins of the Orient to such an extent that he suffered some losses at the hands of the Genoese in the waters of Negroponte. Afterwards, he seems to have scored some minor successes over Turkish mariners on the high sea and later at Smyrna. But until the summer of 1347, he neither attained the Black Sea nor achieved any substantial victories over the enemies of his faith. Meanwhile his wife died, and her death completed the tragedy of his private life. In despair, he suddenly decided to relinquish all his plans and retire to France, where he became a Dominican friar. The pope absolved him from his previous obligations and, in 1351, even granted him the honorary title of Latin patriarch of Alexandria. On January 24, 1354, he was nominated bishop of Paris, but he died at Clermont at the age of forty-three before reaching his new see. To the end, he preferred to retain the semblance of his old titles and subscribed himself "the late dauphin of Viennois."
The highwater mark in the history of the Levantine crusade in later medieval times was reached during the reign of Peter I de Lusignan, Latin king of Cyprus (1359-1369). Since the extermina- tion of the crusader states in the Holy Land, Cyprus had become one of the chief bulwarks of western Christianity in the eastern Mediter- ranean. It was therefore natural that its Latin monarchs should do
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everything in their power to enhance the cause of holy war against their dangerous Moslem neighbors. Thus the island, which became an important trade emporium for the Latins, also turned out to be a key point in crusading activities. As a beginning, the Lusignan kings conducted several minor attacks on some of the coastal towns of Mamluk Syria and Turkish Anatolia. Peter managed indeed to cap- ture the city of Adalia and some other smaller settlements on the southern coast of Asia Minor, but these successes proved to be merely modest forerunners to the sack of Alexandria in 1365. 17
Peter's closest associates in the forthcoming fray were Peter [de] Thomas and Philip of Mezieres, two of the outstanding figures in the propaganda for the crusade. Peter Thomas became Latin patriarch of Constantinople and apostolic legate for the east in 1364. Thence- forth he devoted himself to the twofold task of converting the Orthodox Greeks to the Roman creed and promoting the cause of holy war against Moslems in the Levant. Realizing the tenacity of the Greeks in matters of faith, he found it more advantageous to dwell in Cyprus with a king who shared his aspirations and with his disciple Philip of Mezieres.
When these three champions of the crusade assembled in Cyprus, war with the Moslems became a foregone conclusion. Peter's occupa- tion of Adalia in 1361 only whetted the king's appetite for further and greater victories against the Moslems in other fields. In order to ensure the success of his passagium generate, the king embarked on a European tour to implore the sovereigns of western Christendom for manpower and materiel. He sailed from Famagusta in the company of the patriarch Peter Thomas and his chancellor Philip of Mezieres on October 24, 1362. After a short halt at Rhodes, where he was encouraged by the Hospitallers and their master Roger de Pins, he landed with his suite at Venice on December 5, 1362. He had a royal reception in the commune and obtained promises from the doge Lorenzo Celsi to supply the crusade with indispensable galleys. The king then led a triumphant journey through the north Italian towns of Mestre, Padua, Verona, Milan, Pavia, and Genoa, where he spent more than a month to reconcile the Genoese and win their sympathy and maritime aid for his project. Then he proceeded to Avignon, the seat of pope Urban V, where he successfully carried out some important negotiations under papal auspices with the French king John II the Good, who promised full support to the august visitor. The pope then officially declared the crusade on April 14 and appointed cardinal Elias Talleyrand of ^Perigord apostolic legate for
17. On Peter I and the sack of Alexandria see also below, pp. 353-357.
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the campaign, while the two kings took the cross from Urban's hands. Thence Peter traversed almost the whole of the European continent in search of recruits and material aid from its various potentates and great feudatories. He followed a rather circuitous route across France, Flanders, Brabant, Germany, and back to Paris to discuss concrete details with John II, then traveled around Brit- tany and Normandy until he sailed from the port of Calais to England. He was received with honor at Smithfield by Edward III, who paid all his expenses during his stay in England and presented him with a good ship named Catherine, costing 12,000 francs.
Afterward, Peter spent Christmas of 1363 in Paris and went to meet the Black Prince in Aquitaine, where the news of the death of king John in April 1364 forced his return to the French capital to attend the royal funeral. He had to renew negotiations with John's successor, Charles V the Wise, who was more restrained in his promises than his late father. After assisting in the coronation cere- mony at the cathedral of Rheims, the train of the Cypriote monarch again penetrated Central Europe and won more adherents to the cause, notably at the courts of margrave Frederick III of Meissen, duke Rudolph II of Saxony, and even the Holy Roman emperor Charles IV at Prague, in addition to the kings of Hungary and Poland. Jousts, tournaments, and all manner of festivities were held in his honor everywhere. Cracow was probably the farthest point that he attained eastward. Finally, his entry into Venice was registered on November 11, 1364, and soon afterward he and his chivalry boarded the Venetian fleet prepared for the occasion.
While the king thus journeyed throughout Europe, diplomatic action was conducted by the papal curia in other fields. Cardinal Talleyrand had died, so Urban V appointed Peter Thomas as his successor in the crusade. The new legate and Philip of Mezi&res were the chief instigators in papal activities. Letters were sealed by the pontiff inviting all the sovereigns of Europe to join the crusade, and papal bulls were issued at Avignon to grant the usual privileges together with plenary indulgences to all crusaders. Men of many nations had already been waiting at Venice before the king's arrival, and a number of small companies are said to have sailed from Otranto and Genoa, though the Genoese contribution was much more modest than that of the Venetians in this campaign. All the forces were ordered to converge in the waters of Rhodes, and the king and his retinue finally set sail from Venice on June 27, 1365. Their ultimate objective was guarded as a close secret within the limited circle of his most trusted advisors. He feared the perfidy of
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
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the Venetians, who he suspected might betray the destination of the crusade to the enemy in exchange for trade privileges.
The joint fleet which was convened at Rhodes from Cyprus, Venice, and elsewhere between June and October 1365 totaled about 1 65 vessels, including transports, galleys, and all manner of sea-craft. In the end, the various contingents went aboard their respective ships on Saturday, October 4, 1365, in readiness for their unknown destination. The waters of Rhodes rang with their war cries, and the captains were ordered to sail parallel to the southern coast of Anatolia. Off the little island of Crambusa, the aim of the campaign was announced and the fleet was ordered to turn south in the direction of the city of Alexandria, which they sighted on Thursday, October 9.
Alexandria was undoubtedly one of the most important seaports not only in the Mamluk empire but in the whole of the Mediter- ranean basin. Its remarkable hostels and bazaars abounded in all manner of merchandise. Its markets surged with tradesmen from the east and the west, for here was the center of exchange of the staples and goods of all nations. The immense revenues levied by the sultan from these vast transactions filled his coffers with the money neces- sary for the purchase of the implements of war and the slaves used in fighting the Christians, more especially since the breakdown of the European maritime blockade. Peter's decision to capture Alexandria and use it as a base for further conquests to disable Egypt was regarded as wise, and the times were propitious for the campaign. Ibn-'Arram, governor of the city, was absent on a pilgrimage to Mecca. The reigning sultan Sha'ban was a small boy of eleven, and his guardian prince Yelbogha abused the wide powers with which he was entrusted. The Mamluk battalions were torn asunder into factions without an overall leader. Yet it would be wrong to assume that Alexandria was in no position to withstand attacks. The city was strongly fortified with double walls and a series of invulnerable towers. Its arsenal was full of war materiel, even though the number of regular troops was depleted. The unexpected collapse of the defense was due to other unforeseen causes.
When Peter made a forced landing, after some opposition which his men crushed with little difficulty, the crusaders began to attack the Green Gate on October 10. They soon saw the futility of their endeavors, since the upper walls were heavily guarded in that area. Later in the day, however, they discovered that the section of the walls overlooking the Custom-House Gate was completely unde- fended. That gate opened from the inside to the Custom-House,
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which was locked by the customs officer Ibn-Ghurab to prevent theft of the goods stored therein. Meanwhile, a great tower barred access from the part of the wall above the Green Gate to that above the Custom-House Gate. That gap in the defense provided the attackers with their sole opportunity, which they seized immediately by burn- ing the undefended gate while others employed ladders to mount the wall. The bewildered Egyptians watched the assault and then has- tened toward the land gates to save their lives. These are the main data on which William of Machaut18 and an-Nuwain al-Iskandari, 19 the two historians and eye-witnesses of the crusade from the oppos- ing camps, are in full agreement.
For the rest of the story, we have to rely on the Egyptian annalist-that is, from the occupation of the city on October 10 to its evacuation on October 16. The havoc that followed the appear- ance of the Christian knights within the walls was indescribable. Masses of inhabitants thronged the narrow circuitous lanes with their light treasures, pushing toward the Rosetta Gate in the east and the southern land gates. The miserable fate of those who lagged behind was sealed, for they were either killed or carried into captivity. The trade storehouses were pillaged, and what could not be carried away was destroyed. Public buildings and emptied warehouses were set aflame. The sack of the city was completed systematically, and in that short span of time the "Queen of the Mediterranean" was left in a state of irreparable wreckage; even the Coptic churches of their fellow Christians of the east were looted. The harmless beasts of burden were put to the sword after the conveyance of the booty, and their bodies were collected and burnt only later by the Moslems on reentering the city. When all their havoc was accomplished, the looters took to their ships in groups, deserting their posts in the city, much to the disgust of such dedicated leaders of the crusade as the king and his two consultants, Peter Thomas and Philip of Mezi&res. At this juncture the vanguard of the troops from Cairo, alleged to be some hundred thousand strong, appeared in the outskirts of the city.
In the end, after some futile negotiations between Yelbogha's emissaries and the king on board one of his galleys, the Christian fleet sailed back home laden with booty and without releasing the
18. Ed. Louis de Mas Latrie as La Prise d'Alexandrie ou chronique du roi Pierre Ier de Lusignan (Societe de POrient latin, serie historique, no. 1; Geneva, 1877).
19. Or, as he describes himself, "al-Iskandarani." Excerpts ed. t. Combe, in Farouk University, Faculty of Arts, Bulletin (Majallat Kulliyat alactob), III (Alexandria, 1946), 99-110, 119-129. The full text of an-Nuwairfs "Kitab al-ilmam" dealing with the crusade from the Egyptian side has been published by the present writer in 6 vols., in the Da'iratu'l'Ma'arif-il-'Osmania (new series, Hyderabad, 1968-1973).
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Moslem captives. There ensued a series of minor incidents during the next four years. Prolonged negotiations were interrupted by Cypriote raids on the Syrian and Egyptian shores to force a written peace treaty out of the sultan's hands. But Yelbogha was only playing for time while Egypt was diligently importing timber from Syria to construct a fleet for retaliation on Cyprus. The Egyptians never forgot the calamity which had befallen them at Alexandria, and the Cypriotes were doomed to pay a heavy price for their untoward adventure.20 Peter Thomas died at Famagusta in 1366; his disciple Philip of M6zi6res did not return to Cyprus after the assassination of Peter I in 1369. He later became tutor to the French crown prince Charles (VI).
Perhaps the main immediate result of the sack of Alexandria was the promotion of another crusade which took place in a totally different region. As soon as the tidings of the triumph achieved at Alexandria were circulated in the west, a wave of excitement swept the European courts for the continuation of the work so auspiciously reinaugurated by Cyprus. Pope Urban V at Avignon was overjoyed, while Charles V of France delegated John d'Olivier to inform Peter de Lusignan that his hosts would soon join the Cypriotes in a final effort to rout the Moslems and return the Holy Land to the Latins. Bertrand du Guesclin renewed his crusading vow, and Florimont of Lesparre actually reached Cyprus with a band of followers for the purpose of aiding the king in his strife. Still more important was the project of count Amadeo VI of Savoy, who had previously taken the cross with king Peter from Urban's hands at Avignon. As he was preparing to sail to Cyprus, the Venetians told him, allegedly, that peace had been concluded with Egypt. In any event, he directed the new expedition toward Byzantium to fight the Turks and Bulgars. Amadeo was motivated to take up arms in the Balkans by his relationship with John V Palaeologus, his cousin.
In January 1366 the count began his preparations for what was intended to be a passagium generale. In addition to his own feudal militia, he recruited great numbers of mercenaries from Italy, Germa- ny, France, and England. His fleet, totaling fifteen galleys, was to sail in three squadrons from Venice, Genoa, and Marseilles, with Coron in the southern Morea as their rendezvous, whence concerted action would begin according to a preconceived plan. The count himself sailed from the lagoons of Venice on June 11, 1366, and all the galleys reunited at Coron on July 19. After settling a local dispute
20. Sec below, pp. 371-375.
Ch.I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
19
between Angelo, the Latin archbishop of Patras, and Marie of Bour- bon, the titular empress of Constantinople, Amadeo's ships pro- ceeded toward their first objective, Gallipoli, across the Aegean by way of Negroponte. Gallipoli had been the earliest European prey to Ottoman aggression when in 1354 it was wrested by sultan Orkhan from emperor John VI Cantacuzenus; thenceforth that peninsula had become the chief landing place for the Asian troops on European soil and a magnificent base for military operations in the Balkans. It was in August that the crusaders landed there and took the town of Gallipoli by surprise. After the Moslem garrison fled from the invad- ers, Amadeo appointed Aimon Michel captain of the citadel and entrusted James of Lucerne with the governorship of the town. He left the German company with them as a garrison and set sail for Constantinople.
On his arrival in September, Amadeo discovered that his imperial cousin had been detained at Vidin because the Bulgarians would not permit him safe passage through their territory. This proved fatal to the campaign against the Turks, since Amadeo pursued the Bulgar- ians to regain John V's freedom instead of purging the Balkans of Moslem contingents. The count, wisely avoiding the treacherous land route to the heart of Bulgaria, sailed through the Bosporus and northward on the Black Sea until he landed at a small place named Sozopolis. His men took it by storm, together with a few other Bulgarian coastal towns including Mesembria, until they finally laid siege to the fortified city of Varna. Realizing the impregnability of its walls and towers, however, he decided to send a group of envoys to negotiate the liberation of John V. An agreement was reached whereby the emperor was freed and the siege of Varna was raised. The campaign lasted from October till December and the smaller towns were ceded to the Greeks against the payment of a sum which helped Amadeo to meet his liabilities to the mercenaries, soon to be disbanded after their year's term of service. At the same time, Amadeo tried hard to persuade John to accede to the principle of the reunion of the eastern church with Rome, but his efforts were foiled by the Greeks, who hated the Latins. In the end, the party sailed from Pera on June 4, 1367, and reached Venice on July 31. The count visited Urban V, now in Rome, and ultimately regained Turin, his capital.
A lull in crusading activities followed the indecisive campaigns of Peter de Lusignan and Amadeo of Savoy. Toward the beginning of the last decade of the fourteenth century, the center of crusading
20
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
gravity was moving slightly to the west, where in France the "good duke" of Bourbon, Louis II of Clermont, was persuaded by the Genoese to lead a joint crusade with them in North Africa. Genoese trade had been suffering considerably at the hands of Saracen cor- sairs in the western Mediterranean, and some drastic measures had to be taken to save their merchant fleet from imminent dangers of piracy. The IJaf§id kings of Tunisia encouraged the Moorish pirates, whose chief nest was the strong town of Mahdia, known in the French sources as the "Cite d'Auffrique"; and the Genoese therefore decided to launch a great campaign against it. On the other hand, Louis of Bourbon was fascinated by the idea of marching in the steps of the great St. Louis by conducting a crusade against the city of Tunis. A compromise was reached in 1390 by the allied parties. The Genoese republic provided the fleet with its equipment and man- power, while the duke recruited an army of fifteen thousand, com- prising nobles, knights, men-at-arms, and squires. The Avignonese pope Clement VII granted plenary absolution from sins to all those who joined the crusade, and the French king issued royal ordinances empowering Louis to carry out the enterprise. Gentlemen from France, England, Hainault, and Flanders hastened to enlist under the ducal banner. John Centurione Oltramarino was appointed admiral of the fleet and was accompanied by one thousand arbalesters and two thousand men-at-arms in addition to four thousand mariners from Genoa. The French embarked from Marseilles, and the foreign contingents took to the sea from Genoa. After an uneasy voyage, the ships reassembled at the islet of Conigliera, sixteen leagues off the African coast, and within reasonable reach of Mahdia. They halted at that island for nine days for recuperation and for consideration of their tactics. This delay gave the Tunisians time to muster their forces for the coming battle and to reinforce the city garrison.
The landing of the Christians took place without interruption just outside Mahdia. Then they remained in a continuous state of war for nearly two months of the merciless African summer. On the whole, the city garrison assumed a strictly defensive attitude, while the joint armies of the kingdoms of Tunisia, Bugia, and Tlemsen unremittingly harassed the Christians from outside without allowing themselves to be drawn into an open or decisive battle with them. Though prod- igies of valor were allegedly displayed and all manner of war ma- chinery was used, the issue remained undecided until the Genoese secretly began to treat with the enemies in favor of their trade interests. A truce was concluded for ten years, during which the Moslems were bound to abstain from all acts of piracy on the high
Ch.I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
21
seas. Aljmad, the ruler of Tunisia, also promised to pay an annual tribute for fifteen years to the Genoese for retaining Mahdia in Moslem hands, and further, to pay an immediate war indemnity of 25,000 ducats, to be shared between the duke and the commune. Both sides were exhausted, and the Christian council of war ap- proved the treaty, with the duke insisting that he should be the last to board a galley. The armies reached Europe in October 1390. The Genoese had achieved their aims, and the crusaders had unwittingly helped in the fulfillment of the Genoese aspirations. In other words, the duke and his contingents proved to be a cat's-paw for the clever Genoese merchants, and the Barbary crusade failed to accomplish its original purpose as a holy war.21
The pious propagandists and earnest crusaders had again suffered disillusionment, and their spiritual agonies were voiced in the works of Philip of M6zi6res, who had retired in 1380 to the convent of the Celestines in Paris, to devote himself to crusade propaganda until his death in 1405. The period between the campaign of 1390 and the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 represents the peak of Philip's prolific output in the field of propagandist literature. It was then indeed that his project of a New Militia found its fullest expression in several new tracts, notably in his unpublished epistle to Richard II dated 1395. 22 The importance of this document lies in the fact that it was semi- official, since it was submitted by order of Charles VI of France to the English king. In its nine "materes," or chapters, he preached peace between the two monarchs and the unity of their armies with the New Militia in order to serve effectively the cause of the crusade. Although the proposition was not discountenanced in either of the two courts, its supporters had to turn elsewhere for a leader of the new movement, and this they found in rich Burgundy. Its duke Philip II the Bold wanted his son, John of Nevers, to be knighted in the field of honor fighting the "infidels" and, moreover, to earn much prestige for his duchy by leading the crusade.
The time was ripe for war in the east. Alarming news had reached the west about the advance of the Ottoman Turks even beyond the confines of the Byzantine empire. King Sigismund of Hungary sent John of Kanizsay, the archbishop of Gran, to solicit help at the French court in 1395. The response to the call for a crusade was widespread among the French nobility, particularly in Burgundy.
21. On Louis of Bourbon's crusade see also below, pp. 481-483. Apparently neither the indemnity nor the tribute was ever paid.
22. British Museum, MS. 20, B VI.
22
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
John (le Meingre) Boucicault, marshal of France, the admiral John of Vienne, Enguerrand of Coucy, Philip and Henry of Bar, Guy and William of Tremolay, and many other nobles of distinction took the cross and came with followers, feudal retainers, and mercenary troops to join the movement. Elaborate preparations for this Hungar- ian voyage were undertaken everywhere, especially in Burgundy, where nothing was overlooked and no expense spared, according to Froissart's report.23 Benedict XIII, the Avignonese pope, issued a series of bulls in the course of 1395 to release John of Nevers, now recognized as head of the Franco-Burgundian contingents, from certain vows and to grant him and all his followers the usual plenary absolution from sins on the occasion of the crusade. Still earlier, the Roman pope, Boniface IX, had already declared the holy war in the countries adhering to his obedience in east Central Europe in 1394. The Great Schism of the church in the west did not affect the unanimity of all parties in regard to this crusade.
The news spread far and wide in the western states, and auxiliary armies began to form in Germany and elsewhere. The German crusaders were led by the palsgrave Rupert II (Ruprecht Pipan), the count of Katzenellenbogen,24 count Hermann II of Cilly, and burgrave John III of Nuremberg. Although it was formerly believed that a large English contingent participated in the crusade, the contemporary sources do not justify this view.25 A few Englishmen did take part, and similarly small numbers of volunteers and merce- naries were raised from Spain and the Italian communes. But the main bulk of the army accompanied Sigismund from Hungary, and detachments of no mean size also came from the eastern European countries of Bohemia, Poland, and, above all, Wallachia. The total numbers of the combined forces have been estimated at anywhere from ten to a hundred thousand strong.26
23. Ed. J. M. Kervyn de Lettenhove, 25 vols. (Brussels, 1870-1877); also numerous other editions and translations, including abridged version of Thomas Johnes's text as revised bv H. P. Dunster, in Everyman's Library (London and New York, 1906), p. 540. Cf. the account of J. Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient au XI Ve siecle: Expeditions du Marichal Boucicaut (Paris, 1886), pp. 211-299.
24. Alois Brauner, Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis, 1396 (Breslau, 1876), p. 10, identifies him as John 111, of three contemporaries who held this title.
25. See C. L. Tipton, "The English at Nicopolis," Speculum, XXXVII (1962), 528-540.
26. The units of the crusading army have been estimated as follows: French and Burgundians, 10,000; Germans, 6,000; English, 1,000; Hungarians, 60,000; Wallachians, 10,000; with the other 13,000 comprising Bohemian, Polish, Spanish, and Italian volunteers, and mercenaries; A. S. Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis (London, 1934), pp. 66-67, 184, notes, and idem, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938), p. 440, note 7. But cf. R. Rosetti, "Notes on the Battle of Nicopolis," Slavonic and East European Review, XV (1937), 636, estimating each side's strength at 10,000 to 20,000.
Ch.I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
23
The Franco- Burgundian forces started from Dijon in April 1396 and pursued the route along the Danube. Their general rendezvous with the other contingents was Buda, where all the leaders held a council of war with Sigismund to consider future plans and tactics. This must have taken place in late July or early August 1396. Sigismund suggested the adoption of defensive tactics, which he knew from experience to be more effective in dealing with the Turks. His advice was rejected outright by the western generals, who, according to Froissart, had come "to conquer the whole of Turkey and to march into the empire of Persia, ... the kingdom of Syria, and the Holy Land."
The united armies thus moved south as far as Orsova and crossed the Danube at the Iron Gate. From that point, the real campaign began with several minor successes. The crusaders seized the towns of Vidin and Rahova in Bulgaria, and evidently they did not discrimi- nate between the Turkish garrisons and the original Orthodox Chris- tian natives. Their victorious march south of the Danube, marked by atrocities, met its first check at the strong city of Nicopolis, which they reached on September 10. Nicopolis was built on a fortified hill overlooking the Danube to the north and a vast plain to the south. It was surrounded by double walls and invulnerable towers, and was impossible for the crusaders to take by storm, so they decided to lay siege to it. Although the Venetians had agreed to provide naval support for the crusade, their flotilla never came near Nicopolis. The grand master Philibert of Naillac, however, did appear with a contin- gent of Hospitallers. The siege lasted fifteen days. During that period, no constructive measures were taken to face future emergencies; the besiegers wasted the time in gambling, orgies, and debauchery.
The position on the Turkish side stood in complete contrast to that of the Christian camp. Sultan Bayazid I, called "the Thunder- bolt" (Yildlrim), was besieging Constantinople when the news of the advent of the crusaders was communicated to him from Nicopolis. He raised the siege immediately and mustered all his Asian and European troops for the relief of Nicopolis, which he reached on September 24 with an army about the size of the crusaders'.27 But although the two camps were numerically almost equal, the Turks were far superior to the Christians in discipline, unified action, tactics, and unflagging leadership.
27. The Turks have been estimated to have had a 34,000-man vanguard of infantry, 30,000 cavalry in the "main battle," and 40,000 more cavalry in the rear guard and the sultan's bodyguard; Atiya, Nicopolis, pp. 68-69, 185, note, and Later Middle Ages, p. 446, note 3. But see preceding note for smaller estimate.
24
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
In the first instance, Sigismund urged the French and foreign contingents to remain in the rear for the decisive blow in the forthcoming battle, but these protested vigorously against a plan which would in their opinion deprive them of the honor of leading a victory. Sigismund pleaded that the Hungarians were more conver- sant with Turkish methods of war, and that he wanted to plant the Wallachians in the van rather than leave them in the rear on account of their doubtful allegiance, but his plea was without avail. On Monday, September 25, the French and allied legions occupied the main battle in the van for the first assault, while the greater masses of the Hungarians, Wallachians, and other eastern European contingents were stationed in the rear. Whereas the Christians occupied the plains, the Ottomans arranged their lines on a southern hill in a very strong position. Bayazid placed his irregular light cavalry (akinjis) on the hillside facing the Christians with a thick field of long, pointed stakes behind them. Next above stood the foot-archers (janissaries and azabs). The French and allied contingents galloped uphill with their heavy shire horses and had no difficulty in routing the mounted Turkish vanguard. The survivors fled right and left to regroup their formations behind the archers in readiness to resume hostilities. Confronted by the stakes and exposed to Turkish arrows, the Chris- tian front lines had to dismount and pull the stakes in order to reach the Ottoman bowmen for hand-to-hand fighting. With considerable effort and some losses, they achieved their purpose and inflicted heavy slaughter on the Turks, who fled for their lives toward the hilltop pursued by the Christians. On attaining the summit com- pletely exhausted, the latter, to their horror, saw Bayazid's picked cavalry (sipahis), together with his vassal Serbs under Stephen Laza- revich, several thousand strong, hidden behind the skyline. Thus the pursuers became the pursued and the slaughter was reversed even more fiercely, while the survivors were carried into captivity.
The position of the Hungarians and Wallachians had become desperate even before the Turks descended on the plain. The stam- pede of the riderless horses discarded before the field of stakes was taken in the rear as a sign of discomfiture, and the Wallachians started to withdraw. Confusion followed in the Hungarian lines as a consequence, though Sigismund and his loyal feudatories continued to fight as hard and as long as was humanly possible. In the end, he had to take to flight with some of his leading men, the grand master of Rhodes, and the burgrave of Nuremberg. They boarded a small boat and floated down the Danube to the Black Sea, whence they returned in Venetian galleys to their respective homes by way of
Ch.I
THE CRUSADE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
25
Constantinople, Rhodes, and Ragusa. The rest of their men, apart from the few who managed to save themselves by hurried flight through the neighboring woods, were either killed or imprisoned.
Later, Bayazid was startled when he realized his own losses, esti- mated at "thirty thousand," and his wrath was demonstrated in the treatment of the three thousand Christian prisoners on the morrow of the day of the battle. Stripped of their clothes and tied together with ropes, the captives were led before the sultan in groups to be decapitated in cold blood. Bayazid discovered among them a certain James of Helly, whom he had previously employed in his eastern campaigns and who knew Turkish. It was through his mediation that the French and Burgundian nobility escaped the rank and file's grim fate; their lives were spared for the heavy ransom of 200,000 gold florins. Among others, these included John of Nevers, Enguerrand of Coucy, Guy of Tremolay, and Philip of Artois, count of Eu. Young men under twenty were spared for sale in the slave markets of the Levant or presentation to other Moslem potentates. The news of the complete discomfiture of the crusaders overwhelmed European soci- ety with deep grief, which was alleviated only slightly by the return of the few noble captives after the payment of their heavy ransom.
The downfall of the western chivalry on the field of Nicopolis marked the end of any hope that the Ottoman empire could be destroyed by Christendom, and Turkey was accepted as a European power. Though the road to the Hungarian plains was open before the Turks after Sigismund's disaster and flight, Bayazid preferred to consolidate his Balkan possessions and bide his time for further expansion. Meanwhile, the crusade had become an anachronism. Only a few revered its memory and continued to work hard at resuscitating the moribund movement. After the defeat of 1396, Philip of M6zi£res, in his retreat in the convent of the Celestines in Paris, composed yet another of his famous epistles, which he entitled Epistre lamentable et consolatoire and presented to the duke of Burgundy.28 In it, he enumerates the causes of the calamity and prescribes remedies for healing the wounds of Christendom, which lacked the four virtues of good governance— Order, Discipline, Obedi- ence, and Justice. In their stead, the three daughters of Lucifer- Van- ity, Covetousness, and Luxury -ruled the whole society. The "Nova Militia Passionis" is termed the only hope for the eradication of these vices and for redeeming the honor of (western) Christendom. Philip extols the principles of his new organization, representing the summa
28. Extracts in vol. XVI of Froissart's Chroniques, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove.
26
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
perfectio, to ensure victory for his three "estates" of kings, nobility, and bourgeoisie, equivalent to the classes of commanders, cavalry, and infantry in the forthcoming campaigns against "miscreants." Again, Philip preaches peace and goodwill among all Christians of the west, and he advises the duke of Burgundy, the kings of France and England, and all good Catholics to join forces to avenge their humil- iation in the east and restore the birthplace of Christ to Rome. But Philip of M6zieres was, to use his own words, an old dreamer-a voice from the past in a world of change. The crusade of Nicopolis was the last serious attempt by western Europe at united offensive action of the traditional kind in the history of the holy war against Islam.
Digitized by
II
BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES, 1261-1354
JL rom the first the Byzantine empire had been intimately con- nected with the movement of the western crusades to the Holy Land. It had perhaps even been the appeals of Alexius I Comnenus for aid against the SelchUkid Turks that had put into the head of pope
The principal Greek historians for the period 1261-1453, of primary importance for the Byzantine aspect of the later crusades, are George Pachy meres, De Michael e et Andronico Palaeohgis libri XIII (ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, 2 vols., Bonn, 1835); Nicephoms Gregora$, Byzantina historia (ed. L. Schopen and I. Bekker, CSHB, 3 vols., Bonn, 1829-1855); John Cantacuzenus, Historiarum libri IV (ed. L. Schopen, CSHB, 3 vols., Bonn, 1828-1832); George Sphrantzes, Annates (ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn, 1838, and ed. J. B. Papadopulos, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1935-1954) [while his Chronicon minus is accepted as authentic, the Chronicon mams is disputed, and has been termed a later compilation by Macarius Melis- senus] ; Laonicus Chalcocondylas, De origine ac rebus Turcorum (ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn, 1843, and ed. E. Dark6, Historiarum demonstrationes, 2 vols, in 3, Budapest, 1922-1927); and Ducas, Historia byzantina (ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, Bonn, 1834, and ed. V. Grecu, Istorija turco-bizantina 1341-1462, Bucharest, 1958). All of these are also published in Migne, Patrologia graeca (PG). Further source material is cited in F. J. Dblger, Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des ostrbmischen Reiches . . . , parts 3-5 (Munich and Berlin, 1932- 1965).
Very little has been written specifically on Byzantine attitudes toward the later western crusades; see V. Laurent, "L'Idee de guerre sainte et la tradition byzantine," Revue historique du sud-est europien, XXIII (1946), 71-98; P. Lemerle, "Byzance et la croisade," Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, III (Florence, 1955), 595 ff.; and J. Bouquet's brief "Byzance et les dernieres offensives de POccident contre Islam," Congres de VOrdre International Constantinien (Zurich, 1961), pp. 1-15.
Western sources and monographs, on the other hand, which touch on the Byzantine involvement in the later period are extremely numerous; only a few can be cited here. First we note the general works by A. S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938), covering the entire movement but emphasizing the western and Arab sides; J. Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient au XI Ve siecle (Paris, 1886); N. \oiga, Philippe de Mtzieres (1327-1405) et la croisade au XIVs siecle (Paris, 1896); A. Luttrell, "The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century,*' in J. Hale et al, eds., Europe in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1965), pp. 122-154; and P. Lemerle, L'6mirat d'Aydin, Byzance et VOccident (Paris, 1 957). Other works touching on various of the later crusades and Byzantium are D. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West 1258-1282 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); U. Bosch, Kaiser Andronikos III. Palaiologos (Amsterdam, 1965); and E. Dade, Versuche zur Wiedererrichtung der lateinischen Herrschaft in Konstantinopel im Rahmen der abendlandischen Politik, 1261 bis etwa 1310 (Jena, 1938); also G. Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet de mariage entre l'empereur Michel IX Paleologue et Cath6rine de Courtenay
27
28
A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
III
Urban II the idea of launching the First Crusade.1 The armies of this initial expedition and of the Second Crusade, as well as portions of
(1288-95)," Revue historique du sud-est europien, I (1924), 59-63; and C. Marinescu, **Tentatives de manage de deux fils d'Andronic II Paleologue avec des princesses latines," ibid., 139-140. On Charles of Valois's plans see Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, pp. 40-47, and H. Moranville, "Les Projets de Charles de Valois sur Pempire de Constantino- ple," Bibliotheque de Vtcole des chartes, LI (1890), 63-86. Other modern works dealing in part with the subject are M. Viller, "La Question de Tuition des dglises entre grecs et latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu'a celui de Florence (1274-1438)," Revue d'histoire eccUsiastique, XVI (1921), 260-305, 515-532, and XVIII (1922), 20-60; J. Gill, The Council of Florence (Cambridge, 1959); O. Halecki, Un Empereur de Byzance a Rome, 1355-1375 (Warsaw, 1930); J. Smet, The Life of Saint Peter Thomas by Philippe de Me'zieres (Rome, 1954); and F. J. Boehlke, Jr., Pierre de Thomas: Scholar, Diplomat, and Crusader (Philadelphia, 1966). On the crusade of Peter I of Cyprus and the Byzantine reaction, see Iorga, Philippe de Me'zieres, and on Amadeo VI of Savoy, see K. Kerofilas, Amadeo VI di Savoia nelV impero bizantino (Rome, 1926), P. L. Datta, Spedizione in Oriente di Amedeo VI (Turin, 1826), and E. L. Cox, The Green Count of Savoy: Amadeus VI... (Princeton, 1967). On the battle of Kossovo and Byzantium, see H. Gregoire, "L'Opinion byzantine et la bataille de Kossovo," Byzantion, VI (1931), 247 ff., and on Nicopolis, besides A. S. Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis (London, 1934), and G. Ostro- gorsky, History of the Byzantine State (Oxford, 1956), which is useful for the entire period, see R. Rosetti, "The Battle of Nicopolis (1396)," Slavonic Review, XV (1937), 629 ff.,and G. Kling, Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis im Jahre 1396 (Berlin, 1906). For the entire later period, see E. Pears, The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks (London, 1903); M. Silberschmidt, Das orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des turkischen Reiches nach venezianischen Quellen (Leipzig, 1923); A. Grunzeweig, "Philippe le Bon et Constantinople," Byzantion, XXIV (1954), 47-61; A. G. Mompherratos, Diplomatic Activities of Manuel II . . . [in Greek] (Athens, 1913); and J. W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship (New Brunswick, 1969). For Boucicault's expeditions, see especially Livre des faits du Marichal Boucicaut, ed. J. F. Michaud and B. Poujoulat, in Nouvelle collection des mimoires pour servir a Vhistoire de France, II (Paris, 1836), 205-232. For a collection of articles on the fall of Constantinople, including appeals to the west for a crusade, see Le Cinq-centikme anniversaire de la prise de Constantinople (L 'HeMnisme contemporain, 2nd ser., VII; Athens, 1953); also the articles in Greek and French by R. Guilland on Constan- tine XI, such as "Les Appels de Constantin XI Paleologue a Rome et a Venice," Byzantino- slavica, XIV (1953), 226-244; see also S. Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople, 1453 (Cambridge, 1965). On Humbert's crusade, see U. Chevalier, La Croisade du dauphin Humbert II (Paris, 1920). Other works of importance are J. Gay, Le Pape Climent VI et les affaires d'Orient (Paris, 1904), and W. Miller, The Latins in the Levant (London, 1908); for Catalan designs on Constantinople in the 15th century, see especially F. Cerone, "La Politica orientale di Alfonso di Aragona," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, XXVII (1902), 3-93, 380^56, 555-634, 774-852, and XXVIII (1903), 154-212, and for documents, A. Rubi6 i Lluch, Diplomatari de VOrient catala (Barcelona, 1947). There are some pages of interest in G. Schlumberger, Byzance et croisades (Paris, 1927), and F. Thiriet, La Romanie vinitienne au moyen age . . . (Paris, 1959); finally, for general source material, see N. Iorga, Notes et extraits pour servir a Vhistoire des croisades au XVe siecle (6 vols., Paris and Bucharest, 1899-1916); the propagandists account of William Adam ("Brocardus"), Directorium ad passagium faciendum, in RHC, Arm., II (1906), 367 ff.; and Marino Sanudo "Torsello," Istoria del regno di Romania, ed. C. Hopf in Chroniques grdco-romanes (Berlin, 1873), and Sanudo's Secreta fidelium crucis, in J. Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, II (Hanover, 1611), 1-281.
1. See P. Charanis, "Aims of the Medieval Crusades and how they were viewed from Byzantium," Church History, XXI (1952), 123-134. This covers the first crusades.
Ch. II
BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES, 1261-1354
29
the Third, all passed through Constantinople. And indeed, in 1204, western leaders of the Fourth Crusade, instead of going to Jerusalem, had diverted their forces and attacked and captured Constantinople itself. Thereafter, all the way to 1453, Byzantium, willing or not, would remain in one way or another inexorably bound to all western crusading movements.
In 1261, after more than a half century of Latin occupation, Constantinople was reconquered for the Greeks by Michael VIII Palaeologus.2 After this date the original purpose of the early cru- sades was somewhat altered. For though the primary goal of subse- quent expeditions still remained Jerusalem, the term "crusade" be- gan also to be applied to western projects to reconquer Constantino- ple and restore the Latin empire. Such a perversion of the original crusading ideal was justified even for the more religious-minded westerners on the grounds that the city of Constantine had now fallen into the hands of "Greek schismatics," in effect semi-infidels. By this criterion a crusade against Christian Constantinople became either a worthy goal in itself or-as crusader-propagandists of the fourteenth century came to emphasize— a preliminary step to uniting eastern and western Christendom so that, with the greatest possible force, the "holy war" could be carried to the Moslems in Jerusalem.
After 1261 western leaders of the crusading movement, with some notable exceptions, were not unduly troubled by the need for finding an ideology for their expeditions. To the politician of the west, be he prince or pope, the crusade all too often became merely a political or military effort of which the primary goal was the ag- grandizement of the leader himself or of the institution he repre- sented. The old religious zeal of the west, the contagious piety so important in launching the First Crusade, had now conspicuously diminished. The crusades had become secularized.
Among the Byzantines what might perhaps be considered proto- crusades, expeditions to recapture Syria and Palestine, had been conducted as early as the seventh century by their emperor Heraclius and in the tenth century by Nicephorus Phocas and John Tsimisces. Nevertheless, despite these "holy" wars, the ideology of a crusade in the western sense of the word, as an expedition preached by the church to recover the Holy Sepulcher, with remission of sins prom- ised to the expedition's participants, was totally alien, indeed almost incomprehensible, to the Byzantines.3 It does not have to be noted
2. See volume II of this work, pp. 228-232.
3. See V. Laurent, "L'Idee de guerre sainte," pp. 71—98; Lemerle, "Byzance et la croisade," pp. 595 ff.; and A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (Madison, Wis., 1958), especially pp. 389-400. P. Alphandery and A. Dupont, La Chrdtientt et I'idde de
Digitized by
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that in these tenth-century Byzantine expeditions to Syria and Pales- tine, the Greek soldiers did not wear the cross as a badge, nor did they term their wars "crusades."4 Rather, behind their expeditions was not so much the concept of freeing the Holy Land from "the pollution of the infidel" as the desire to restore to the authority of the basileus certain lost areas of the Basileia, the sacred empire, in particular Syria and Palestine.
The Byzantine lack of appreciation for the religious aspect of western crusading ideology may already be seen during the First Crusade. Even the usually astute Anna Comnena demonstrated a certain lack of insight when she viewed all the western knights merely as predatory, bent only on looting the empire. Nor does the sophisticated emperor Alexius I seem truly to have appreciated the extent of the genuine piety in crusader motivations. He was, to be sure, amazed at the masses of westerners who left home and family to take the cross. But he always suspected that the motive of self-aggrandizement, the personal ambition of the leaders, was at the bottom of all crusading ventures, despite the outpouring of pious fervor that manifested itself on the surface. Alexius's worst fears of Latin motivations were confirmed by the aggressive actions of Bohe- mond -fears transmitted to his grandson, Manuel I, and from him to all subsequent Greek emperors. By Manuel's time (1 143-1 180) there was greater reason for the Byzantine suspicion of the crusading movement. For during the Second Crusade (1147) Louis VII of France had contemplated taking Constantinople, and similarly in 1 185 the late Manuel's archenemy, the German emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, encamped before the walls of the capital, had pondered whether to assault the city. After the Fourth Crusade in 1204, with its unparalleled looting of Constantinople and enforced Greek con- version to "Catholicism," Byzantine suspicions and fears of the Latins had became so ineradicably a part of their psychology that nothing thereafter seemed able to assuage them.
Accordingly, from the time of the Greek recovery of Constantino- ple by Michael VIII in 1261 until the final fall of the city in 1453,
croisade: Les premiers croisades (Paris, 1959), is of little help on the Byzantine side. See also S. Runciman, 'The Byzantine Provincial Peoples and the Crusade," Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, III ( 1 955 ), 62 1 -6 24 .
4. Possibly the first, or one of the first, Byzantine uses of the western term crusade is in Nicetas Choniatcs (staurophoroi: bearers of the cross), referring to the western knights of the First Crusade coming to Constantinople. This term is not used during the 9th- and 10th-century Byzantine campaigns in Syria and Palestine, and the Greek church, though it blessed the Greek armies and was anxious for the recovery of the holy places and holy relics, did not promise any special rewards such as remission of sins to the expedition's partici- pants.
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whenever the Byzantines heard of western plans for a new crusade they at once assumed a negative, defensive posture. With few excep- tions most Byzantines paid no heed at all to the idealism, the pious words of pope Gregory X (1271-1276) or of certain enlightened western crusader-propagandists like Humbert of Romans (d. 1277) and Marino Sanudo Torsello (d. 1334). Almost pathologically the mentality of the Byzantine man on the street came to be deeply conditioned by the conviction that the crusades were merely orga- nized expeditions of bandits aimed at the resubjugation of Byzan- tium. Whatever their guise might be-whether an overt attempt to restore the Latin empire, a crusade to take Smyrna, or plans to attack Egypt-all mass movements to the east on the part of western arms and men were for the Byzantines suspect and potentially terrifying.
The history of Byzantium's connection with the later crusades may be divided into three major phases. The first, from 1261 to 1331, the death of prince Philip of Taranto, grandson of Charles I of Anjou and heir to his aspirations, was dominated by the attempts of western claimants to restore the Latin empire. In the second phase, extending from 1331 to the battle of Nicopolis in 1396, western expeditions to the east were motivated both by papal fears and by the commercial interests of Venice, whose eastern trade and colonies were increasingly threatened by the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Hence arose the dual aim of clearing the Aegean of Turkish pirates and establishing a Latin beachhead in Asia Minor-considerations leading to the remarkable western-Byzantine coalition of 1334 and the crusade to Smyrna in 1344. Byzantium was, to be sure, not directly involved in all these expeditions, and never really responded positively to appeals for a crusade, although a change in the situation had effected a partial alteration of the Byzantine attitude. With the end, in 1331, of overt western attempts to restore the Latin empire of Constantinople, some Greeks began to realize that their own fate might well depend on whatever results western arms might be able to achieve against their oppressors, the Ottoman Turks. The once mighty Byzantine empire had by then become in large part merely an onlooker, one which gazed as if mesmerized yet was almost powerless to do anything about events directly affecting its own destiny. In the third phase, from 1396 to 1453, the overwhelming problem which cast everything else into the shade was the ever-growing threat of the Ottoman Turks, who had almost completely encircled Constantino- ple and who, if Constantinople should fall, would even menace the west. Growing increasingly fearful of the Turks, the leaders of Latin
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Christendom launched or helped to launch two major expeditions to aid the Byzantines: the luckless crusade of Nicopolis in 1396,5 and the essentially Polish-Hungarian crusade of Varna in 1444. 6
The Byzantine point of view in connection with the crusading expeditions from 1261 to 1453 has not hitherto been dealt with systematically. Though any direct Byzantine involvement in these events is usually difficult to ascertain, it was, nevertheless, often greater than appears on the surface. Indeed, if one judges strictly from the Byzantine viewpoint, all three phases from 1261 to 1453 may be characterized as a Byzantine struggle for survival-in the first, to preserve Greek independence in the face of threats from western pretenders to the throne of Constantinople, and in the two subse- quent phases, to protect the empire against the advancing Ottoman Turks.
Byzantine statesmen from Michael VIII to 1453 realized that Byzantium had become too weak to stand alone and must therefore secure allies from the only source that could provide effectual help, the west, in particular its leader the pope. At the same time the Byzantines understood that from him no aid would be forthcoming unless they were willing to pay his price, ecclesiastical union, entail- ing subordination of the Greek church to Rome. Hence, as we shall see, in all three periods a basic, sometimes the most significant, factor was the repeated proposals of the Byzantine emperors to the popes and western rulers for union of the churches. And it is this factor, with its accompanying and often complex diplomatic negotia- tions, that seems always to be intertwined with, at times even to predominate in, the history of Byzantium's involvement in the later crusades.
The majority of the Byzantine populace, however, remained so deeply hostile to the Latins that any attempt at union, for whatever reason, was rejected out of hand. It was not only the persistent fear of a possible new Latin invasion that aroused the Greeks against ecclesiastical union, but even more, it would seem, the belief that union meant the dilution of the purity of the Orthodox faith and thus, through this beginning of a process of Latinization, the loss of their identity as a people. Paradoxically, as the medieval Greeks became weaker and weaker politically and militarily, more than ever they clung tenaciously to their religion, believing that loss of the Orthodox faith would bring with it the destruction of the empire itself. By 1400, in fact, certain segments of the populace, especially
5. See above, pp. 21-25.
6. A chapter on the crusade of Varna is planned for volume V of this work, in preparation.
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among the lower classes, came to prefer as the lesser of two evils the possibility of Turkish occupation to a renewed Latin domination. In any discussion of Byzantium and the later crusades, therefore, many complex factors must be considered: political, social, economic, and religious. In the final analysis, however, it is the last-mentioned factor, the question of accepting or rejecting union with Rome, that always seems to he near the surface, and gives an element of con- tinuity to the total picture.
The reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus (1261-1282),7 which opens the first phase of Byzantium's involvement in the later crusades, is in a sense the prototype for all east-west relations up to 1453. It was he who established that pattern of imperial diplomacy, so often to recur, of offering religious union to the papacy in exchange for support in thwarting the designs of external enemies against Con- stantinople. Almost immediately upon recovering Constantinople in 1261 Michael had to face the problem of western attempts to restore the Latin empire, often through the launching of a new crusade. For in conquering Constantinople Michael had not only ended Latin rule but had, at the same time, terminated papal jurisdiction over the Greek church, a control which at least technically the popes had exercised since 1204. From 1261 onward it was the aim of almost all popes to seek by one means or another the return of the "schis- matic" Greeks to the "bosom of the Roman church," an aim which many western ecclesiastics believed could best be accomplished through the medium of a new crusade.
The immediate reaction of pope Urban IV, on hearing of the Greek recovery of Constantinople,8 was to look to the preservation of the remaining Latin possessions in Achaea, Negroponte, and the Aegean islands, while at the same time taking measures to secure western support for the dethroned Latin emperor Baldwin II. To this end Urban commanded the preaching of a crusade in France, Poland, and Aragon— a crusade whose stated goal was not, as before, the Holy Land, but the recovery of Constantinople.9 Urban's directive is significant because it is the first in history to order the preaching of a crusade specifically against the Greeks. Though, to be sure, in 1204 Innocent III had finally sanctioned the conquest of Constantinople by the western armies of the Fourth Crusade, his earlier, more
7. On Michael's relations with the west, especially the papacy, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael.
8. Ibid., chap. V.
9. Ibid., pp. 139-142.
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immediate reaction had been to excommunicate the Latin troops. Now, however, in the time of Michael VIII we see pope Urban justifying a crusade against Constantinople not only on the grounds that the "schismatic" Greeks had again fallen away from Rome, but-as the pope wrote to Louis IX urging him to join the anti- Byzantine expedition-because "if the Greeks seize all of Romania, the way to Jerusalem will be barred."10 In a subsequent letter sent to bishop Henry of Utrecht, Urban was in fact to proclaim that he would promise "to all who personally [assist in the restoration of the Latin empire] the remission of sins, the same privileges granted to those aiding the Holy Land."11
To preserve the Latin territorial possessions in the east and restore Latin rule over Constantinople, Urban now took a very active part in forming a coalition consisting of the Latin princes of the Morea (the Peloponnesus), the dethroned emperor Baldwin II, and the Venetians of Negroponte. In May 1 262 and subsequently in July of the same year, these parties, the pope among them, signed at Viterbo an agreement prescribing joint action against Michael in the Morea.12 But their efforts bore little fruit; the Greco- Latin struggle over the Morea was to last almost until 1453.
Urban's plan to launch a crusade against Constantinople never really got off the ground. The most respected ruler of the west, the French king Louis IX, was not disposed to fight a Christian emperor, even a Greek "schismatic," believing that all military efforts should instead be directed to recovering Jerusalem.13 But a more basic deterrent to a crusade against Constantinople was the preoccupation of the papacy itself with its struggle against the Hohenstaufen heirs of Frederick II, notably Frederick's illegitimate son Manfred, king of Sicily. Urban therefore shifted the focus of his attention from a Byzantine crusade to a crusade against the papacy's more immediate antagonist, Manfred;14 for the next seven years almost all papal political maneuvers would be motivated by the desire to crush the Hohenstaufen.
From the first, Michael VIII was aware of the powerful western enemies his capture of Constantinople would evoke. Hence directly after his recovery of the city, he sent two envoys to the pope bearing
10. Ibid., p. 142.
11. J. Guiraud, ed., Les Registres d'Urbain IV (1261-1264), II (Paris, 1901), no. 577, pp. 292-293 (dated 1264).
12. Ibid., II, 47-48, and cf. II, 292-293.
13. R. Sternfeld, Ludwigs des heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis, 1270 (Berlin, 1896), p. 308, and Dade, Versuche, p. 1 1 .
14. W. Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz (Berlin, 1903), p. 431, and Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 143 ff.
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letters promising to establish ecclesiastical union with Rome if the pope would recognize his possession of Constantinople. 15 Neglecting no diplomatic opportunity, Michael also made overtures to Manfred, offering an alliance against the papacy. When negotiations with Manfred proved futile,16 Michael redoubled his efforts vis-a-vis the pope, even proposing, in addition to union, his aid for a crusade to recover Jerusalem, an astute maneuver because at that time Urban was himself promoting the launching of a crusade against the Greeks.17 Realizing the papacy's power, Michael indicated in his letter to the pope his readiness to subject all the eastern patriarchs to Rome. 18 Fearful of Manfred's increasing power in Sicily, Urban on his side seized upon Michael's offers of union. But soon the appear- ance in Italy of the new papal champion Charles I of Anjou, to combat the Hohenstaufen, swung the pope again away from Palaeo- logus, and Urban announced his intention to reestablish the Latin empire as soon as Manfred was defeated.19
With the death of Manfred in 1266 at the battle of Benevento and the execution at Naples in 1268 of the only surviving legitimate successor of Frederick II, the young Conradin, Byzantine relations with the Latin west entered a more critical period. The new master of southern Italy and Sicily, Charles of Anjou, the shrewd, energetic, and intensely ambitious brother of Louis IX, now became captive to the old Norman-Hohenstaufen dreams of conquering Constantinople. Thus almost immediately after his enthronement Charles began to muster a tremendous coalition of forces against Michael Palaeologus, a coalition including Michael's Latin enemies, many of the Italian communes, Byzantium's Slavic neighbors, and, finally, even the Ve- netians, who hoped to displace their rivals the Genoese in the lucrative Byzantine trade. Arranging a diplomatic marriage between his son Philip and Isabel, the heiress of William of Villehardouin, prince of Achaea, Charles in 1 267 signed the treaty of Viterbo, the terms of which purported to give Charles and Philip legal title to Byzantium and called for Charles to attack Constantinople and restore the Latin empire.20
15. Ibid., pp. 140-141, quoting Pachymcres, De Michaele . ..,11, 36 (CSHB, I, 168- 169).
16. Pachymeres, III, 7 (CSHB, 1, 181, 183).
17. Guiraud, Registres dVrbain IV, II, no. 577, pp. 292-293; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, p. 176.
18. Guiraud, Registres d'Urbain IV, 11,357.
19. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, p. 184 and pp. 164-165, notes 14, 16.
20. Treaty printed in G. del Giudice, Codice diplomatico del regno di Carlo I e Hd'Angid, II (Naples, 1863), 30 ff. See also J. Longnon, 44 Le Rattachement de la principautc de Mor6e au royaume de Sicile en 1267," Journal des savants, 1942, 134-143; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 197 ff.
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One very important figure was still lacking in Charles's alliance, the pope. As spiritual head of Christendom his sanction was indis- pensable if Charles's expedition was to be blessed as a crusade. Moreover, as the pope was Charles's direct feudal overlord for Sicily, his approval was all the more necessary for a Greek campaign. For the next fifteen years Charles and Michael were to pit their for- midable diplomatic talents against each other, each in the aim of winning the papacy to his side. Michael VIII continued his policy of holding out the bait of union to the popes. Under Urban's successor Clement IV, moreover, he again brought up the question of a crusade to the Holy Land. But this time Michael offered to participate personally in the expedition as well as to enlist the support of the strategically situated Christian king of Cilician Armenia, Hetoum I. He assured the pope that with the participation of the Greeks, Latins, and Armenians, the Mamluks of Egypt were sure to be defeated. In exchange Michael asked the pope to provide him with guarantees that Byzantium would not be attacked by Latins while he himself was away on the crusade.21 The negotiations between em- peror and pope, which had progressed far, were suddenly brought to a halt in 1268 by the death of Clement.
Clement's demise removed the chief obstacle to Charles's plans for a Greek expedition, and the Angevin monarch now began anew to muster his forces. Michael, however, agilely responded by sending appeals to the brother of Charles, Louis IX of France. Realizing Louis's unfaltering desire to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, Michael shrewdly pointed out to the French king that an attack upon Constantinople by Charles would adversely affect Louis's own plans for a crusade. "If the forces of both Charles and Michael are set at war with each other," Michael told the king, "neither can contribute to the security of your own expedition." Envoys from Michael appeared before Louis's camp in Tunisia during the latter's ill-starred crusade in North Africa in 1270, bearing splendid gifts and hoping to enter into direct negotiations. Before anything could be discussed Louis succumbed to the plague and Michael once again had to face an unrestrained Charles of Anjou.22 Only an act of fate, a storm
21. E. Jordan, ed., Les Registres de CUment IV (1265-1268) (Paris, 1893; repr. 1945), no. 1201, p. 404; A. L. TOutu, ed.,Acta UrbanilV, dementis IV, Gregorii X (1261-1276) (Vatican City, 1953), no. 25, pp. 71-72.
22. Jordan, Registres de Clement IV, no. 1201, p. 404. Also L. Br6hier, "Une Ambassade byzantine au camp de Saint Louis devant Tunis,'* Melanges offertsd M. Nicolas Iorga (Paris, 1933), p. 140; Pachymeres, V, 9 (CSHB, I, 362-364); O. Raynaldus (Rinaldi), Annates ecclesiastici, ad ann. 1270, no. 33; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 224-227. See also volume II of this work, pp. 509-518.
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which shattered Charles's fleet off Trapani in Sicily, now spared Michael's capital from invasion.23
Charles, though disappointed, was undaunted and immediately began to rebuild his fleet and refurbish his alliances. But he was again frustrated when in 1 27 1 , after a papal interregnum of three years, Gregory X was elevated to the papal throne. Strong-willed, pious, and able, Gregory had himself long been consumed by a desire to recover Jerusalem from the Moslems, and he tended to view every- thing else as subordinate to this aim. Not only would good relations with Byzantium, as he saw it, be beneficial to Christendom, but, more important, only with Greek support could Jerusalem be re- taken and maintained.24 To halt Angevin designs against Byzantium Gregory now even pushed Charles into making a truce with Michael.
The negotiations taking place between Michael and Gregory culmi- nated in 1 274 in the celebrated Council of Lyons, at which religious union was signed by the pope and Michael's envoys, headed by his grand logothete George Acropolites.25 We omit discussion of the theological aspects of the council in order to examine its implications for the crusade. As far as Michael was concerned, Lyons was pri- marily an act of political expediency entered into in the aim of saving his throne and empire. For Gregory, on the other hand, perhaps the only truly sincere actor in the drama transpiring at Lyons, now that the two churches of east and west were finally united, it was only natural to expect that both would join in a great crusade to overwhelm the Moslems and restore Jerusalem to the Christians.
As has already been emphasized, the underlying religious motives for a crusade were not grasped by the Byzantines. Thus Michael, fearing a repetition of the Latin conquest of 1204 if massed western armies should again appear in the east, demanded that Gregory assure the integrity of his empire. Michael's surprising confidence in the pope's intentions therefore seems to have been based on what he believed to be Gregory's power and authority, on the pope's sincerity of motive, and, no less important, on the belief that Gregory would personally lead the crusade through the Byzantine territories.
23. Gcanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 227-228; William of Nangis, "Gesta Philippi tertii francorum regis," in RHGF, XX, 480.
24. V. Laurent, "La Croisade et la question d*Orient sous le pontificat de Gregoire X (1271-1276)," Revue historique de sud-est europten, XXII (1945), 105-137, and his "Gregoire X (1271-1276) et la projet d'une ligue antiturque," £chos d'Orient. XXXVII (1938), 257-273.
25. On Lyons, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 258-276, and volume II of this work, p. 584.
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But all was for naught. The union of the two churches was accomplished only on paper. Most Greeks insisted that, since the four eastern patriarchs had been unrepresented at Lyons and since no later council had pronounced it ecumenical, Lyons was nothing but a "robber council." Thus for them the act of union subscribed to by pope and emperor was invalid. Far more basic than this legal techni- cality, however, was the deep-seated emotional aversion of the Greeks for anything Latin. Near civil war resulted upon the return of Michael's envoys to Constantinople. Violently rejecting the results of Lyons, the Byzantine populace believed that effective union with the Latins would corrupt the purity of their faith. Worse, they insisted that if the faith were corrupted, Constantinople, the city "guarded by God," would itself be doomed because of the loss of divine favor. The unionist patriarch John Beccus acutely reflected this feeling when he wrote, "Men, women, the old and the young consider the peace [with the west] a war and the union a separation."26 Even the idea of a cooperative effort by Greeks and Latins to recover Jerusa- lem was derided by the people. The Virgin, the protectress of Constantinople, would never, the Byzantines believed, sanction an expedition against territories rightfully belonging to themselves if it were launched in alliance with Latin "heretics."
Yet in courting the pope Michael had at least achieved his imme- diate aim. The act of union proclaimed at Lyons acted as a powerful brake to the aspirations of Charles of Anjou. With the Greeks again apparently reconciled to the Roman church, any expedition Charles launched against Byzantium would not be regarded as a true crusade. Rather, in the eyes of Gregory at least, it would be a fratricidal war between two "Catholic princes," a war which, instead of promoting a crusade against the Moslems, would actually weaken the Christians. With Byzantium in effect now a kind of papal protectorate, Charles, as a vassal of the pope, could hardly contravene Gregory's orders to desist.27
Negotiations moved forward regarding the question of a crusade. Shortly after the signing of union at Lyons the papal legate to Constantinople, Bernard Ayglier, abbot of Monte Cassino, returned to Rome with a report that Byzantine ambassadors charged with discussion of the crusade would soon follow.28 The imperial envoys,
26. Pachymeres, V, 23; V, 14; VI, 23 f.; Ill, 1 1; VI, 24 {CSHB, 1, 401 ff., 379 ff., 482 ff., 192-193, 489 ff.).
27. Geanokoplos, Emperor Michael, chap. XII. On Charles's career see also S. Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers (Cambridge, 1958).
28. Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 285-286.
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George Metochites, archdeacon of Constantinople, and the grand intendant Theodore, met in 1276 with Gregory, probably first in southern France and later at Lausanne, where they witnessed the western emperor Rudolph of Hapsburg taking the cross.29 Already at Lyons Gregory had proclaimed that the arms of both the eastern and the western emperors would crush Islam, and Michael in turn had promised that Byzantium would contribute provisions, revenues, troops, and whatever else was necessary for the passagium to the Holy Land. Undoubtedly Michael had at first suggested the general idea of a crusade as an inducement to curry favor with Gregory. Now, however, his envoys came forward with a striking new propo- sal: that the Latin crusaders, instead of crossing by sea, should proceed by land across the Balkans to Constantinople and thence through Asia Minor.30 Apparently Michael had in mind a repetition of what had been achieved by his predecessor Alexius I: reconquest from the Turks, by means of the crusader armies, of the former Byzantine territories in Anatolia. Execution of such a plan would not only restore Asia Minor to Byzantine rule and avert the danger of the Turks in general, but at the same time serve to thwart the growing menace of the Mamluks of Egypt, who were now penetrating Cilician Armenia.
According to Metochites' report, pope Gregory seemed favorable to the plan. Impressed by Michael's plea for the recovery of "the hallowed Christian cities of Asia Minor," .Gregory agreed that the land route would avoid for the western armies the hardship and danger of a long sea voyage as well as providing a strong base of operations from which to take and maintain Jerusalem. Moreover, the grave problem of finding enough ships to transport the western armies across the Mediterranean would be solved.
To insure complete accord on the plan, pope and emperor, it is interesting to note, were to meet personally for discussions either at Brindisi on the Adriatic or at Avlona in northwest Epirus.31 But the death of Gregory in January 1276 removed the possibility of a united Christendom opposing the Turkish advance in Asia Minor. Not that such a joint venture would easily have succeeded. The
29. M. H. Laurent, Le Bienheureux Innocent V (Pierre de Tarentaise) et son temps (Studi e testi, 129; Vatican City, 1947), pp. 269, 440.
30. Sec report of Metochites in V. Laurent, **Le Rapport de Georges Metochite, aprocrisi- aire de Michel VIII Paleologue aupres du pape Gregoire X (1275-1 276)," Revue historique du sudest europe'en, XXIII (1946), 233-247, and V. Laurent, "Gregoire X"; cf. Geana- koplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 287-289.
31. M. H. Laurent, Le B. Innocent V, pp. 439-440; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 288-289.
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mutual distrust of Latins and Greeks, the probable unwillingness of Latin leaders to relinquish territories taken by their arms, the con- stant temptation for the crusaders to seize Constantinople for them- selves, and finally the ill-will, if not overt hostility, of the Byzantine population to the entire expedition-all these factors would have seriously hampered the success of any such joint action, and perhaps even resulted in war between Greeks and Latins.
Under the new pope, Innocent V, the plan for a land expedition through Anatolia was abandoned. Apparently Michael VIII had con- fidence only in Gregory, or the new pope may have distrusted the Greeks. Moreover, the western leaders may have believed that a sea route was more practicable.32 Nevertheless, negotiations for some kind of joint expedition were continued by Michael and Innocent. Now, however, Michael raised many questions as to the participation and attitude of western rulers. He also sought to clarify the question of the future of Egypt, since Michael himself was then in alliance with the Mamluk sultan Baybars. To these complex political factors was added the question of how the union of Lyons was to be implemented in the Byzantine areas. This was a particularly touchy matter since Charles of Anjou was continuously pressing the pope to unleash him against Michael on the grounds that the emperor was reneging on or lax in fulfilling his promises to implement the union.33
Several popes succeeded Innocent, and with all of them Michael exchanged numerous embassies. In 1277, however, he encountered a really intransigent pontiff, Nicholas III. While expressly forbidding Charles to attack Constantinople, Nicholas demanded that Michael, in accordance with papal stipulations, impose on his empire complete uniformity of (Latin) dogma and liturgical custom. To this end the pope sought to dispatch a cardinal-legate to Constantinople and even to demand from each Greek ecclesiastic a personal oath of submis- sion to Rome.34 Meanwhile Charles, impatient at all the years of
32. Actually the land route was no longer practicable for the west, especially as Adalia, on the southern Anatolian coast, had been in Turkish hands since 1207. Thus after 1204 Cyprus was considered even more precious than Constantinople. But when Michael VIII reigned, Constantinople was again considered necessary for a crusade to Jerusalem. See V. Laurent, "La Croisade et la question," p. 133, and his "Gregoire X," pp. 265-267; also the 1 3th-century theoretician Fidenzio of Padua, Liber de recuperatione Terrae Sanctae, in G. Golubovich, ed., Biblioteca bio- bibliogra flea della Terra Santa e dell' Orient e francescano, II (Quaracchi, 1913), 51. M. H. Laurent, Le B. Innocent V, p. 273, does not think Gregory was well informed as to the risks involved on the land route.
33. M. H. Laurent, Le B. Innocent V, pp. 256-286. Pachymeres, V, 26 (CSHB, I, 410) describes Charles as pressing the pope against Michael.
34. E. Van Moe, "L'Envoi de nonces a Constantinople par les papes Innocent V et Jean
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waiting, launched a premature attack across the Adriatic against the Byzantine town of Berat in Albania, presumably with the ultimate aim of driving along the Via Egnatia to the Byzantine capital itself. At Berat Michael was, however, able to achieve a stunning military victory over Charles.35
Still not daunted, Charles, at the death of Nicholas III, was able at long last to arrange for the elevation in 1281 of a pontiff favorable to his political aspirations, Martin IV. Soon after his enthronement Martin, repudiating the union of Lyons, excommunicated Michael and "urged" Charles to lead a crusade against "the Greek schis- matics."36 The death knell of the Byzantine empire seemed about to sound, for in addition to the papacy Charles's many allies now included the powerful Venetian fleet. But Michael was equal to the challenge. For some time he had been pursuing a diplomatic policy of allying himself with the pro-Hohenstaufen, anti-Angevin elements in Sicily, and also with king Peter III of Aragon, son-in-law of Manfred. Michael poured Greek gold into the coffers of the Aragon- ese king and at the same time subsidized the Hohenstaufen party in Sicily. Finally, on Easter Monday, March 30, 1282, a dramatic event, the Sicilian Vespers, occurred, the Sicilians rising in revolt against the hated Angevin rule. They were joined shortly by the forces of Peter of Aragon, and soon Charles's troops were completely expelled from the island.
In this celebrated event the fine hand of Michael, even if active only behind the scenes, undoubtedly played a significant role.37 Thus Michael VIII Palaeologus, largely through his diplomatic genius, saved his empire from Charles I of Anjou, whose plans constituted, in the entire period from 1261 to 1453, the most serious attempt to reestablish Latin rule over Byzantium. Charles's preparations received considerable publicity in Constantinople and did a good deal to embitter the Byzantine attitude toward the west. More than ever the Greeks came to believe that any military succor coming from the west would ultimately be directed against Constantinople. Moreover,
XXI," Melanges d'archMogie et d'histoire, XLVII (1930), 48 ff.; V. Grumel, "Les Ambas- sades pontificates a Byzance apres le IIe concile de Lyon (1274-1280)," lichos d'Orient, XXIII (1924), 437^147; J. Gay and S. Witte, eds., Les Registres de Nicolas III (1277-1280), part 1 (Paris, 1898), pp. 76-86; Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael pp. 305-324.
35. Ibid., pp. 329-334.
36. Bull of excommunication in Raynaldus, Annates ecclesiastici, ad ann. 1281, no. 25, and F. Olivier-Martin, ed., Les Registres de Martin IV (1281-1285) (Paris, 1901-1935), p. 100, no. 69, and p. 115, no. 78.
37. On Michael's role in the Sicilian Vespers, see Geanakoplos, Emperor Michael, pp. 344-367 and the bibliography cited there.
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after Michael's attempt to ram the union of Lyons down the throats of the Byzantines, the latter became even more certain that a western crusade would bring with it the attempted conversion of the Greeks to Catholicism— the final result of which would be the Latinization of the Greek people. The Greek rabble, significantly, had shouted to Michael's legate on his return from Lyons: "Efrangepses!" ("You have [through accepting union] become a Frank!").38 For the Latins, on the other hand, the memory of the Byzantine disavowal of the union of Lyons undoubtedly served to increase western suspi- cions of the Greeks, and thus the next two centuries, as we shall see, would witness failure after failure on the Latin side to provide Byzantium with any effective aid against the Turks.
Under Michael's son and successor Andronicus II Palaeologus (1282-1328) there was, as might be expected, a violent reaction in Byzantium against what appeared to be the pro-western orientation of Michael. No longer endangered by the threat of an Angevin crusade, Andronicus, reflecting popular sentiment, now reverted to a policy of overt anti-Latinism. The Greek churches were purified of "contamination" from association with the Latins, and it was the turn of Michael's adherents to be incarcerated, while the former anti-unionists returned to power from exile or imprisonment.39 All that remained of the eight years of attempted communion with Rome was a growing Greek hatred of the Latins, which increased the more as subsequent popes excommunicated the Greeks40 and ac- corded favor to a series of French pretenders who began to claim the Byzantine throne. Indeed, the popes of the late thirteenth century and the Avignonese popes of the early fourteenth continued the policy of Martin IV. In place of a precarious entente with the Greeks, they generally preferred a military effort at restoration of the Latin empire, their French orientation making them automatically parti- sans of the Valois claimants to the throne of the Latin empire of Constantinople.
One pope, however, Nicholas IV (1288-1292), did seek a peaceful solution to the problem -through a diplomatic marriage which, if we can believe a western source, he himself proposed between Catherine
38. Report of Metochites in M. H. Laurent, Le B. Innocent V, p. 424, note 23.
39. Nicephorus Gregoras, VI, I (CSHB, I, 160). The anti-union reaction was not com- plete: see Pachymeres, De Andronico . . . , I, 7 (CSHB, II, 22-23), emphasizing a celebration attended by Greeks and Latins in which only some of the Greeks gave candles to the Latins.
40. Clement V, the first Avignonese pope, excommunicated Andronicus II in 1307, and actually awarded the crusaders going against Byzantium the indulgences of an expedition to the Holy Land (Raynaldus, Annates ecclesiastici, ad ann. 1306, no. 25; ad ann. 1307, nos. 6-7).
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of Courtenay, the titular empress of the Latin throne, and the Greek heir-apparent, young Michael (IX) Palaeologus.41 Andronicus II, on his side, riding the current of anti-Latinism, was at first uncertain of what policy to follow with respect to the pope,42 although one Byzantine source implies that the initiative was his.43 In any event, he showed interest when he realized the possibility, through this marriage, of warding off a western threat to Constantinople in the person of a princess who, as granddaughter to the last Latin emperor, Baldwin II, had fallen heir to his claim to the Latin throne at the death in 1283 of her father Philip. The negotiations collapsed, however, the overpowering anti-unionist sentiment in Constantinople making it impossible for Andronicus to fulfill the papal condition for the marriage -recognition of the pope's supremacy over the Greek church. Soon thereafter, in 1295, Michael IX married Rita ("Maria Xenia"), a sister of king Hefoum II of Cilician Armenia, thereby foreclosing this opportunity to achieve a solution to the political disagreement between east and west.44 Thereafter Andronicus, occu- pied with Byzantine internal affairs, remained largely indifferent to western developments until later, when the danger from the west once again became pressing.
As for Catherine, a succeeding pope, Boniface VIII, reverting to Martin IV's aggressive policy toward Constantinople, sought to marry her to a powerful western prince able to arouse Europe to a crusade against Byzantium. Indeed, according to one modern authority it was following a suggestion originally contained in a memoir (composed c. 1300) of the French legist and propagandist Peter Dubois, that in 1301 a marriage was concluded between Catherine and Charles of Valois, brother of the French king, Philip IV the Fair, thus giving Charles a claim to the Latin empire of Constantinople.45 Dubois in another work, De recuperatione Terre Sancte, advised king Philip that on the return of the French "crusading" armies from recaptur- ing Jerusalem they should, under Charles of Valois, stop on the way
41. See Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet," pp. 59-63, and Marinescu, "Tentatives de mariage," pp. 139-140.
42. In 1284 Andronicus II himself married Yolanda ("Irene"), daughter of William VII, marquis of Montferrat, so as to do away with the Montferratine claims to the Byzantine throne. Nicephorus Gregoras, VI, 2 (CSHB, I, 167-168) says that the pope withheld his approval.
43. Ibid., VI, 8 (CSHB, I, 193), however, implies that the initiative was taken by the "king of Italy," Catherine's father. He says that the negotiations failed because of the excessive demands made by the westerners ("dia ta hyper to prosekon zetemata").
44. Ibid., VI, 8 (CSHB, I, 193 ff.); cf. Bratianu, "Notes sur le projet," pp. 59 ff.; Marinescu, **Tentatives de mariage," pp. 1 39-140.
45. Dubois was ostensibly discussing how Philip IV could acquire universal domination. On all this see Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, pp. 48 ff. On the memoir, see E.
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
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and capture Constantinople from its unlawful ruler "Palerlog" [An- dronicus II].46 The might of France was to be thrown into the balance behind western designs against Byzantium.
Two western protagonists now arose to revive the old aspirations of Charles I of Anjou. Their support came from France and the Angevin kingdom of Naples. Philip of Taranto, the son of Charles II of Anjou, king of Naples, held Angevin territory in Epirus and claimed suze- rainty over Latin Greece. In alliance with the Catholic Albanians Philip carried on minor military operations in the Balkans but accom- plished little. More significant was the activity of Charles of Va- lois,47 brother of Philip IV and husband of Catherine of Courtenay, who in 1306 entered into alliance with Venice, the enemy of An- dronicus and of his Genoese allies. Venice could not resist the temptation to revert to its aggressive anti-Byzantine policy of 1204, especially in view of the fact that after 1261 Michael VIII had bestowed upon the Genoese most of the old Venetian privileges in the Byzantine empire. In June 1307 Charles of Valois prevailed upon pope Clement V, the first of the Avignonese popes, to support the projected undertaking by excommunicating Andronicus II and even offering to the "crusaders" who would combat Byzantium the same indulgences accorded to crusaders going to Jerusalem.48 The anti- Byzantine alliance being organized won the adherence of Naples and of the Serbs under king Stephen Urosh II Milutin. Charles was even able to number among his supporters certain Byzantine nobles,49 a circumstance revealing the degree of internal disorganization in By- zantium at this time.
Only a few years before, the famous Catalan Grand Company had appeared in the east.50 A small but reckless and powerful group of adventurers from Catalonia and Aragon who had fought in the long war which culminated in the Sicilian Vespers, they had been deprived
Boutaric, La France sous Philippe le Bel (Paris, 1861), pp. 41 1-413; it is apparently still unpublished.
46. English trans, by W. I. Brandt, The Recovery of the Holy Land (Columbia University Records of Civilization, no. 51; New York, 1956), p. 172.
47. On Charles of Valois's plans, see Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, pp. 40-47; Moranville, "Les Projets," pp. 63-86; and J. Petit, Charles de Valois, 1270-1325 (Paris, 1900), pp. 114 ff. Cf. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 440-441.
48. Raynaldus, ad ann. 1306, nos. 2-5; ad ann. 1307, nos. 6-7: letter of Clement V to archbishop Reginald of Ravenna; cf. Viller, "La Question de runion," Revue d'histoire eccUsiastique, XVI, 270, note 2. See also Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernieres offensives/* p. 5.
49. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 441: the governor of Thessalonica and the com- mander of Sardis.
50. See below, pp. 167-171.
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of employment with the signing of peace in 1302 at Caltabellotta between the Sicilian Aragonese and the Neapolitan Angevins. They then made their way to the east, where they offered their services to Andronicus. Most of the provinces of Byzantine Asia Minor had already been overrun by the advancing Ottoman Turks; the Ottoman peril to the remnant of Asia Minor had brought Byzantine affairs to a grave crisis, once again necessitating reorientation of Byzantine pol- icy toward the west. Hence Byzantium's interest in any new Latin plans for a crusade.
The Mongol invasion of the mid-thirteenth century had stirred up the entire Near East. As a result several nomadic Turkish tribes had been pushed into Asia Minor, where they came into collision with the Selchiikid principalities of the area or, farther west, with the Byzantine territory in Anatolia. The old Byzantine system of border defense utilizing the so-called akritai (border-defenders) had fallen into decay, in large part because of Michael VIIFs preoccupation with the western danger. Michael's removal, in 1261, of the Byzan- tine administrative center from Nicaea to Constantinople had itself served to reduce the Byzantine powers of resistance in Asia Minor.51 After Michael's death in 1282 the meagerness of the funds in the imperial coffers brought about a further reduction of Byzantine military forces. Finally, the internal factor of the loosening ties between the central government and the provinces, or what has been termed the growing "feudalization" during the Palaeologian period, also hastened the decay of the Greek military freeholdings on the Anatolian frontier. These combined financial, social, and political considerations helped to undermine the Byzantine system of admin- istration and defense in the east, the result being that by 1300 almost all Asia Minor had succumbed to the Turkish flood. Only a few Greek fortresses on the Aegean seacoast remained, along with the several Selchiikid principalities.
At this critical juncture the leader of the Catalan Grand Company, Roger de Flor, offered his services to Byzantium against the Ottoman Turks in Bithynia. With the acceptance of the proposal by emperor Andronicus in 1303, the Catalans proceeded to defeat the Turks in several campaigns in Asia Minor. But emboldened by their success and disgruntled by the irregularity of their pay, the arrogant Catalans began to pillage Byzantine territory around Constantinople. Rela-
51. G. Arnakes, The First Ottomans (in Greek; Athens, 1947). Pachymeres, De Mi- chaele . . . , II, 28 (CSHB, I, 149) quotes the Byzantine writer Senacherim as seeing the supplanting of Nicaea by Constantinople as the chief cause of the weakening of the eastern frontiers.
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
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tions between Greeks and Catalans grew increasingly tense until 1305, when suddenly Roger was assassinated in the palace of the imperial prince, Michael IX.52 Open warfare now broke out, with the Catalans plundering a wide range of Byzantine territory and even sacking the monasteries of Mount Athos.53
It was in this period of acute distress for Byzantium that Charles of Valois reached an agreement against Andronicus with representatives of the Catalan Grand Company. In 1308 Charles's plenipotentiary, Theobald of Cepoy,54 arrived in Euboea with Venetian vessels, whence he proceeded to Cassandrea, in Macedonia, in order to receive an oath of fealty from the Catalan Grand Company.55 But the Catalans, indifferent to Charles's plans, did not implement the alli- ance. Instead, after ravaging Thessaly, they unexpectedly moved on to the weakened Burgundian duchy of Athens. On March 15, 1311, in a notable battle at the Cephissus river, they annihilated the numerically superior forces of the Frankish nobles. Thenceforth Frankish power in Thebes and Athens was replaced by Catalan; the principality they established at Athens and Thebes was to endure for over seventy years.56
The withdrawal of the Catalans to Frankish Greece not only brought relief to Byzantium but left high and dry the aggressive plans of Charles of Valois.57 Meanwhile, the legal claim of the Valois to the crown of Constantinople had, on the death early in 1308 of Charles's wife, Catherine of Courtenay, passed to her daughter Cath- erine of Valois. In 1313 the latter, though still a child, was married to Philip of Taranto, who thereupon formulated more intensive plans for the conquest of Constantinople.58 Indeed, with the death of king Philip IV of France in 1314, and of his brother Charles of Valois in
52. Sources are Nicephorus Gregoras, VII, 3 (CSHB, I, 220 ff.) and Pachymeres, De Andronko . . . , V, 12 (CSHB, II, 393 ff.) for the Byzantine viewpoint. The Catalan Raymond Muntaner participated in the expedition (Crdnica, ed. K. F. W. Lanz, Stuttgart, 1844; new ed. by "E. B.," Barcelona, 1927-1951, 9 vols, in 2; trans. J. A. C. Buchon in Chroniques ttrangeres relatives aux expeditions franqaises pendant le XIII* siecle, Paris, 1875). There is a large literature on this; see Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 439.
53. Vasiliev, Byzantine Empire, p. 606. No wonder the Byzantines feared the crusades: a few thousand trained Catalan troops could keep their formerly great empire in a state of anxiety and ruin. See below, pp. 167-169.
54. J. Petit, "Un Capitaine du regne de Philippe le Bel, Thibaut de Chepoy," Le Moyen age, ser. 2, 1 (1897), 231-236, and his Charles de Valois, pp. 1 14 ff.
55. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 441.
56. K. M. Setton, Catalan Domination of Athens (Cambridge, Mass., 1948); A. Rubi6 i Uuch, Diploma tari de I'Orient catald (Barcelona, 1947). See below, chapters VI and VII.
57. Moranville, "Les Projets," pp. 63 ff.
58. L. de Mas-Latrie, Commerce et expeditions militaires de la France (Collection de documents inedits, Paris, 1880), pp. 62-78. For letters on the projected expedition to Constantinople, see Viller, "La Question de 1* union," RHE, XVI, 270.
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1325, Philip of Taranto remained as the only prince interested in a crusade to recover the Latin throne of Constantinople. In 1318 Philip allied himself with the Angevin king of Hungary, Charles Robert, and, in 1320, bought certain rights in the principality of Achaea. He even secured papal support to call upon Frederick II, king of Sicily and a papal vassal, for help against Byzantium.
But Philip of Taranto's projects, though supported by the power of France and Naples, did not advance beyond the preparatory stage. The political and internal conditions of the west were simply not right for such an expedition. Thus the schemes of both Charles of Valois and Philip— pale imitations, one might say, of those of their more able predecessor Charles I of Anjou-eventually disappeared like smoke. Even avaricious but realistic Venice had in 1310 signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with Andronicus II.59 Never again, in fact, was Venice to attempt to revive the now hopeless schemes of the Fourth Crusade. And in 1324 Venice, her traditional interest in the restoration of the Latin empire shelved, went so far as to inform Andronicus that the western princes had no intention of attacking the imperial city.60
As for the papacy, its attempt to return to the policy of Innocent III had become anachronistic and could not be implemented in this century of "decroisades." Indeed, the only westerners who now seemed eager to go to the east were merchants and mercenaries. This marked the end of any really serious attempt at western restoration of the Latin empire, though an occasional pretender to the Latin throne of Constantinople was not lacking even as late as 1494, when the French king Charles VIII would launch his fateful invasion of Italy, with Constantinople his probable ultimate objective.61
Despite the end of the ambitious designs of Charles of Valois and Philip of Taranto, sporadic but abortive attempts to use force against Byzantium continued to be made from time to time. Thus, in 1323 Andronicus learned that a French fleet in the service of pope John XXII and under the command of Amalric of Narbonne was on the point of setting sail for Constantinople.62 Alarmed by what he
59. On all this, see Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 442.
60. See Bouquet, "Byzance et les derniers offensives." But note, however, the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello's plans for cooperation between Byzantium and Venice for a crusade to recover Jerusalem, in his Secreta fidelium crucis, ed. Bongars, II, 281; cf. especially Sanudo's letters (dated 1 324 and 1 326) to Andronicus II on church union and the crusade 01,299, 301).
61. See M. Gilmore, World of Humanism (New York, 1952), p. 151.
62. L. Br&iier, in Cambridge Medieval History (1927 ed.), IV, 614, and C. Diehl et al, L'Europe orientalede 1081 a 1453 (Paris, 1945), p. 223.
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pope as his envoy the Genoese bishop of Kaffa in the Crimea, in order to assuage John's hostility by reopening the pourparlers for religious union.63 In view of the calamities and dangers to his empire, it is not surprising that Andronicus felt he could not main- tain to the end his uncompromising attitude toward the Latins of the earlier part of his reign. The pope's immediate reaction to Androni- cus's demarche is not known, but several years later Andronicus made still another proposal. For, in 1326 (or 1327?), despite the categorical statement of Venice as to the cessation of western aggres- sive designs on Byzantium, king Charles IV the Fair of France had himself taken the cross. And it was this event, leading Andronicus to believe that French forces would soon be directed at Constantinople, which evoked the Greek emperor's new initiative. As his envoy the Greek emperor in 1327 sent to Paris a noble Genoese, Simon Doria,64 who in diplomatic terms affirmed "the emperor's desire to live in peace with all Christians" and especially with the French ruler-in other words proposing a treaty of non-aggression together with a plan to seek union of the churches. At Paris and Avignon this was exaggeratedly interpreted as a promise of ecclesiastical union.65 In the same year, acting in accord with pope John XXII, the French monarch, Charles IV, sent to Constantinople as his envoy a Dominican professor of the Sorbonne, Benedict Asinago of Como, with full powers to conclude a union of the churches.66 When Benedict arrived in Constantinople, however, he found the capital torn by dissension, a virtual civil war having broken out between the old emperor Andronicus II and his young grandson Andronicus (III). Neither of the two antagonists wished to risk his position with the people by entering into negotiations with the papal envoy regarding union. Benedict's mission was therefore over before it had even begun and he returned empty-handed to France. A western monk, Philip Incontri, then living in Pera, across from Constantinople, explains in the following manner the reason for the reluctance of Andronicus II to deal with Benedict:67 "The emperor, fearing that
63. Simon Doria (see below) may be the "bishop of Kaffa" sent by Andronicus, rather than Jerome, listed by C. Eubel, Hierarchia catholica medii aevi . . . , I (2nd ed., Miinster, 1913; repr. 1960), 154, as elevated in 1322 and dead by 1324.
64. Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernieres offensives," p. 6. The bishop of Leon, Garcia of Ayerbe, expressing his opinion on the crusades to Charles IV of France, said that the crusaders should go by land and envisage a Tatar alliance; they should first conquer the Greeks and then turn on the Moslems (Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, p. 83).
65. Bouquet, op. cit., p. 6, and cf. Diehl, VEurope orientate, p. 223.
66. Bouquet, loc. cit.
67. See Thomas Kaeppeli, "Deux nouveaux ouvrages de Frere Philippe Incontri de Pera," in Archivium Fratrum Praedicatorum, XXIII (1953), 172-173.
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the Greeks of Constantinople would rise against him and deliver the empire to his grandson, Andronicus III, pretended . . . that his envoy [to the west] had imperfectly understood and had not in fact reported his exact words."68 The implication in this statement seems to be that Andronicus II had previously made some kind of secret commitment regarding religious union to the pope and the French king, from which he was now seeking to back away.
As the report of Benedict states, Andronicus protested that the present time was inappropriate for realization of the union "because of the suspicions that our people generally have [for the Latins] " ("propter suspicionem quam haberet generaliter populus noster.").69 To justify his conduct, Andronicus wrote to the French king explain- ing the state of affairs in Byzantium and enclosing a letter of apology.70 The result was that pope John, after hearing the report of his emissary Benedict of Como, abandoned his plans for religious union.71 The French king himself died the following year (1328). Fate had again intervened to relieve Byzantium of another enemy seeking to conquer the empire under the guise of a crusade. This episode, though inconclusive, is significant because it shows that once more the west had given in to the illusion that the "conversion" of the Greek emperor would ipso facto guarantee that of his subjects.
The difficulties experienced by the pope in raising an army in the west-despite the several claims to the Latin throne of Constan- tinople—were due in great part to the internal political situation of the west. France and England were preoccupied with the quarrel which would culminate in the Hundred Years' War. Emperor Louis IV the Bavarian had withdrawn Germany from papal influence, while the papacy itself, in exile at Avignon, was unable to control even Italy. Venice and Genoa, the only two powers that could in any way be counted on, were more interested in assuring their profits than in undertaking a hazardous expedition of conquest.72 Moreover, the competition between Venetians and Genoese in the east was often encouraged by the Byzantine emperor himself when it served his purposes. Merchants of the two cities even trafficked with the Turks
68. Also H. Omont, "Projet de reunion des eglises grecque et latine sous Charles le Bel en 1327," Bibliotheque de Vtcole des chartes, LIII (1892), 254-257.
69. Ibid., p. 255.
70. Andronicus wrote two letters: Omont, "Lettres d'Andronique II au pape," ibid., LXVII (1906), 587.
71. A curious passage in Cantacuzenus, II, 4 (CSHB, I, 335, line 16) relates that in 1328 the Germans sent an envoy to emperor Andronicus II asking monetary aid on the basis of an old alliance.
72. W. Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-age (trans. Furcy Raynaud, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885, repr. 1923, 1936, Amsterdam, \961), passim.
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
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in defiance of papal fulminations against the practice, and western knights, for the sake of adventure, not infrequently became merce- naries of the Turkish sultans. Finally, though the Venetians and Genoese were repeatedly able to put into battle against each other thirty to forty galleys, when called upon to fight the Turks they could contribute only three or four vessels for the service of Chris- tendom. The "ecumenical" spirit of the earlier Middle Ages-a cru- sade presumably for the benefit of the west as a whole-seems to have almost completely evaporated.
In Byzantium, meanwhile, Andronicus II had been deposed by his grandson, who in 1328 assumed the imperial throne as Andronicus III. Once in power the latter reached a decision to continue the policy of friendliness to the Latins characteristic of the latter part of his grandfather's reign, and especially to reestablish friendly relations with the papacy -relations which had not really been cordial since 1281, the failure of the union of Lyons. Andronicus's policy was dictated by his preoccupation with the Turks, whose progress in Asia Minor during the reigns of Michael VIII and especially Andronicus II had become increasingly disastrous for Byzantium. Another factor affecting Andronicus's decision may well have been the influence of his second wife, Anna of Savoy, who as a Latin princess had formed a pro-unionist party in Constantinople.
In the same year (1327) that the shadow of Charles IV of France was cast over Constantinople, efforts had been initiated in the west to form a league against the Turks which would bring together those Latin powers with vital interests in the Levant.73 The Turks, in order to attack the coastal Byzantine cities of Asia Minor more success- fully, had taken to piracy and were now harassing both the Greek and the Latin possessions in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. To protect the Latin crusader states in the east in the face of this danger, the pope and especially Venice sought to form a union to fight off the Turks. This proposal for an anti-Turkish front was implemented in Rhodes on September 6, 1332, 74 an agreement being signed by a representative of the Hospitallers of Rhodes and by Peter da Canale, the plenipotentiary of Venice, who found himself, in a complete reversal of Byzantine policy, also the representative of emperor Andronicus III.75 The event is especially meaningful because it was the first time since before the Fourth Crusade that Byzantium had
73. Lemerle, U&mirat d'Aydin, p. 54.
74. Ibid., p. 92.
75. Diplomatarium veneto-levantinum (1300-1454), ed. G. M. Thomas, I (Venice, 1880; repr. New York, 1965), no. 116, pp. 225-229.
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become associated with any west European project for a great coalition, such as had long constituted its gravest danger. The realiza- tion had apparently finally dawned on at least a few Byzantines that the primary threat to Byzantium's existence lay not so much in the west but rather in the farther advance of the Turks.
The terms of the treaty were as follows: the Greek emperor-and this is extraordinary in view of the precarious state of Byzantine finances-was to furnish ten galleys for a period of five years; Venice was to provide six, the Hospitallers four. The fleet was to assemble at the port of Negroponte on April 15 of the following year (1333), and the commander was to be a Venetian.76 But the coalition was not ready to take action until May of 1334, at which time the several signatories were joined by three more powers, king Hugh IV of Cyprus, king Philip VI of France, and the pope, John XXII, whose role had actually been decisive behind the scenes during earlier negotiations.77 According to the anti-Latin Byzantine historian, Ni- cephorus Gregoras, the emperor felt compelled to join the coalition after receiving a menacing embassy from the western powers calling upon him to join his forces to theirs under penalty of being con- sidered an enemy. The same author notes that Andronicus had to press his subjects hard to collect the gold required to equip a fleet of twenty ships.78 Yet in the spring of 1335 when the fleet was in readiness the Latins, because of problems arising among themselves, defected.79
Nevertheless, some naval operations, resulting in occasional de- barkations in Asia Minor, did take place, with the result that for some months a certain protection was afforded to the Christian population, both Greek and Latin, of the Aegean area, along with greater security of navigation.80 One of the more important achieve- ments of the enterprise was the destruction in the gulf of Adram- myttium of the Turkish fleet under Yahshi. The return of the allied fleets to their home ports, however, was not followed by the recon- stitution of the expedition, since on December 4, 1334, pope John XXII died.81 For some time events in the west, especially the
76. Ibid.
77. Lcmerie, loc. cit.; cf. Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, pp. 97 ff., which gives different figures for negotiations at Avignon. The famous Directorium ad passagium facien- dum of William Adam (ascribed to "Brocardus"; see below) was written as a guidebook for the king of France on the expedition.
78. Nicephorus Gregoras, XI, 1 (CSHB, I, 524).
79. Ibid. (I, 523-525): "Thoryvous kai tarachas hoi Latinoi cholethentes apraktoi kai pseutheis peri tas eppaggelias ephanesan." w
80. Lemerle, L'imirat d'Aydin, p. 98.
81. Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, p. 100.
Digitized by
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hostility between France and England, prevented either power from joining a common naval front against the Turks. The final result was the dissolution of the coalition and the resumption of Turkish piratical activity in the Aegean.82
With respect to the crusade, it should be noted that in this period the idea of a crusading expedition against the Greeks was gradually giving way in the west to the idea of a common Greco-Latin enter- prise against the Turks menacing the Christian eastern possessions, both Greek and Latin. As we shall see, this attitude would be the prelude to the concept of saving Constantinople and the Balkans from the Turks by means of a crusade. The reasons for this signifi- cant change are to be found, as we have seen, in the awareness of the many difficulties involved in reestablishing the Latin empire of Constantinople, and, more especially, in the growing realization that perhaps more could be accomplished against the Turks through the collaboration of east and west on a plane of friendship and alliance. With respect to the last point, the influence of certain western theoreticians and promoters of a crusade was significant; in general they tended to discourage overt Latin aggression against the Greeks and to emphasize rather the importance of acquiring a knowledge of the east, its language, and its people. For this purpose missionaries were to be sent to the east.83
Nevertheless, some of the most important crusader theoreticians - like William Adam and especially Raymond Lull-though accepting the need for collaboration with the Greeks, insisted that the Greeks first must be converted to Catholicism, by force if necessary. William Adam even suggested a kind of "brain-washing" of the Greeks, by sending one child from each Greek family to the west to be raised in the Latin faith. Later, Peter Dubois recommended that noble, edu- cated Latin girls go to the east to do charity work in hospitals, the most comely to marry leading Greeks (clerics in particular!) in order ultimately to convert the entire east to the Catholic faith.84
82. On these matters Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, has been corrected by Lemerle, L'imirat d'Aydin, p. 100, note 1.
83. Especially Golubovich, Biblioteca bio-bibliografica.
84. On all these see Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West (Oxford, 1966), p. 2. It should be noted that scholars now agree that the Directorium ad passagium faciendum was not written by "Brocardus." According to Ch. Kohler, he never existed; see "Documents relatifs a Guillaume Adam archeveque de Sultaniyeh ..." Revue de I 'Orient latin, X (1903-1904), 16-56, especially p. 17, and his "Quel est Pauteur du Directorium ad passagium faciendum?" ibid., XII (1909), 104-1 1 1. But not all scholars agree that it should be attributed to William Adam; see F. Pall, in Revue historique du sud-est europien, XIX (1942), 27-29 (of offprint), and cf. below, p. 543, where it is attributed to "William Adam or (more probably) Raymond Etienne." It is referred to hereafter, however, as the work of
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In 1333, Andronicus III had entrusted to two Dominicans return- ing from a mission to the Mongols a message for pope John XXII.85 Andronicus's letter was received favorably by the pope, who there- upon wrote to the principal dignitaries of the Greek empire, seeking to open negotiations for union through his envoy, the Genoese Pisani. The two Dominicans had returned to Constantinople with instructions from the pope, directing them to hold public discussions with the Greek clergy. But the mission of the papal ambassadors was rendered ineffective because of the intervention of the scholar Ni- cephorus Gregoras, who in an eloquent and lengthy speech argued against putting trust in the words of the Latin envoys. As Gregoras himself put it in his history: "In 1334 there came to Byzantium two bishops from the pope to discuss the peace and unity of the churches. When the people of Constantinople saw them they became excited. The patriarch and the bishops, ignorant of Latin, called upon Gregoras [who knew Latin] to talk with them. I, however, not considering their proposal worthy of attention, decided not to waste my time. However, to satisfy the patriarch and bishops, I got them together and gave a long speech explaining why they should pay no heed to them. . . ."86 As the result of Gregoras's intervention, the negotiations came to nothing.
In 1335, in order to demonstrate his good will and at the same time not lose the possibility of future western help, Andronicus III consented to participate in a new crusade to recover the Holy Land, being organized under the leadership of the new pope Benedict XII and Philip VI, king of France. Philip's intentions regarding a crusade were probably more sincere than had been those of his uncle Philip IV the Fair.87 For where Philip IV had used the crusade as a facade to gain other ends for the crown-church tithes, destruction of the Templars, and, probably, the conquest of Byzantium through his brother Charles of Valois-Philip VI seems to have desired a pas- sagium (a full-scale crusade) to the Holy Land at least in part for religious reasons.88 Pope John XXII, impressed by Philip's apparent zeal, had promulgated two bulls which gave the king the right to levy the tithe on church property for a period of two years. In 1333 the privilege was renewed for six years. Thus for this crusade all the
William Adam. On Lull, see S. Cirac Estopafian, "Ramon Lull y la union con los Bizantinos: Bizancioy Espafia," Cuadernos de historia Jerdnimo Zurita, III (Saragossa, 1954).
85. On earlier messages from this pope to the Mongols, see below, p. 543.
86. Nicephorus Gregoras, X, 8 (CSHB, I, 501 ff.).
87. S. Runciman,/! History of the Crusades, III (Cambridge, 1954), 1440.
88. Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, p. 86.
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resources of the church -revenues from tithes, church benefices, and indulgences -were put at the service of the French king.
Already in 1331 Philip had written to Venice to ascertain the conditions under which the Venetians would be willing to partici- pate. But Venice took six months to answer. In fact it was less the Holy Land that interested Venice than her commerce in the Aegean, which was now endangered by the raids of the Turks in the area. In order to have a plan for the crusade Philip had asked for the drawing up of memoranda setting forth a definite program.89 Among the propaganda writings produced was a detailed, carefully worked out scheme submitted by William Adam (erroneously ascribed to one Brocardus), who had lived in Lesser Armenia (Cilicia), and whose primary aim was the achievement of a religious union of the Arme- nians with Rome. William Adam's scheme was grandiose and interests us here primarily for what he had to say about Byzantium and the crusade. In his eyes an essential preliminary for the success of any western crusade to the Holy Land was the conquest and conversion of Byzantium.90
In 1339 Andronicus, growing more and more fearful of the Turkish advance, which by 1338 had reached the Bosporus across from Constantinople, sent a secret mission to pope Benedict XII. The embassy's aim was to secure western aid for a joint crusade against the Turks. It was the turn of the Greeks to take the initiative for a joint Greco-Latin expedition. Andronicus's envoys were the Venetian Stephen Dandolo and one of the most famous of Byzantine human- ists, Barlaam, the Calabrian monk and hegoumenos of the monastery of the Savior in Constantinople. Arriving in Avignon the envoys eloquently pleaded the cause of Byzantium before the pope.91
In his plea Barlaam, the chief envoy, proposed two main points: the convocation of a general council at which the question of religious union would be discussed, and the organization of a crusade not only to recapture the Holy Land but to deliver the Christian towns of Asia Minor from the Turks. Andronicus's tactics are clear: he sought from the beginning to allay the deep anti-Latin fear of the Byzantine populace through the convocation of an ecumenical coun- cil-a council in which all the patriarchs would appear and open discussion would be held. Moreover, through the organization of a
89. Ibid., pp. 86-87, and Lemerle, Vtmirat d'Aydin, pp. 90-91; Bouquet, "Byzance et les dernieres offensives," p. 8.
90. Directorium ad passagium faciendum, in RHC, Arm., II, 367 ff. Cf. Marino Sanudo's plan for Byzantine- Venetian cooperation for a crusade to Jerusalem, in his Seer eta fldelium cruris (see above, note 60).
91. Gay, Ctement VI, pp. 49-50.
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crusade he envisaged, following the precedent of Alexius I and the plans of Michael VIII, the recovery of Byzantine provinces of Asia Minor from the Turks. Most important in his proposals was his insistence on discussions to be entered into before the consummation of union, a point directly contrary to papal policy, which insisted on the conclusion of union first and then discussion. These points, which were made in two speeches to the pope and the assembled cardinals of the curia, deserve at least to be summarized because Barlaam here states more clearly than anyone else the difficulties lurking in the minds of the Byzantines with respect to religious union. As he put it to the pope:92 "The emperor does not dare to manifest publicly that he desires union with you. If he did declare this, a great number of princes and men of the people, in the fear that he would renew the experience of Michael Palaeologus, would seek an occasion to put him to death."
As Barlaam realized only too well, the problem for the emperor was, in accordance with papal demands, to find the means to promise union and to begin its execution without at the same time irritating his subjects. For they did not want to hear even the suggestion of a Latin rapprochement.93 Thus on behalf of the emperor, Barlaam proposed a formula that might without violence lead the Greeks to union and at the same time show the pope their sincerity. It was the suggestion of a general council to be held in the east. As he said,
You have two means peacefully to realize the union. You can either convince the scholars, who in their turn will convince the people, or persuade both people and learned men at the same time. To convince the learned men is easy, since both they and you seek only the truth. But when the scholars return home they will be able to do absolutely nothing with the people. Some men will arise who, either from jealousy or from vainglory, and perhaps believing they act rightly, will teach all exactly the opposite of what you will have defined. They will say to the Greeks, "Do not let yourselves be seduced by these men who have sold themselves for gold and are swelled up with pride; let them say what they wish, do not change anything of your faith." And they will listen to them. ... To persuade therefore both the people and the learned men together there is only one way: a general council to be held in the east. For the Greeks admit that all that has been determined in a general council conforms to the faith. You will object, saying that already at Lyons a council to treat of union was held. But no one of the Greeks will accept that the Council of Lyons was ecumenical unless another council declares it so. The Greeks present at Lyons had been delegated neither by the four patriarchs who govern the eastern church nor by the people, but by the emperor alone, who, without seeking to gain their consent, wanted to
92. PG, CLI, cols. 1341 ff.; cf. Viller, "La Question de Punion," RHE, XVIII, 21-24.
93. Peats, Destruction of the Greek Empire, pp. 69-70, says that on his arrival at Avignon Barlaam pointed out that the Turks had seized four metropolitan sees and suggested that, as a condition for religious union, the Turks be expelled from Asia Minor.
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achieve union by force. Therefore send legates to the four patriarchs; under their presidency a general council will be held which will make union. And all of us who will have been present at this council will say to the people, "Here is what the Holy General Council has decreed. It is your duty to observe its decisions." And all will submit.94
At this point Barlaam added a crucial stipulation -that no such coun- cil could take place until the Latins first aided the Greeks to evict the Turk from the towns of Asia Minor. But the provision was flatly re- jected by Benedict XII and his cardinals, who insisted that it was not proper to put in question an article of the faith which had already been defined.95 Curiously enough, Gregoras was later to turn the same phrase against the Latins. Barlaam had not been given full authority to negotiate for the emperor, and in effect spoke in his own name. Andronlcus III, in fact, afraid of public reaction in Constantinople to such a report, had dispatched him secretly to Avignon. Benedict and the curia argued every point raised by Barlaam, upholding the papal principle of conversion first, then military assistance. Despite the intense interest generated, the interview in the end produced only vague promises, and no concrete results came about.
Nevertheless, though his proposals were not accepted, Barlaam's speech remains of the utmost significance for understanding Byzan- tine psychology with respect to union. Having lived for long periods in both east and west, and being possessed of an equally good knowledge of both Latin and Greek, he was supremely qualified to assess the fears and hopes of each side. His program reflected accu- rately not only the political realities of the situation, but more important, the Greek attitude and complaints against the Latins, which sometimes they themselves perhaps did not fully understand, emotional as they had become in their psychology of a dominated people. As he put it so well: "The Greeks feel they have been wronged and it is up to you to offer a concession to them first." But Barlaam's words fell on deaf ears. He was too far ahead of his time-ahead of the Greeks because he realized that in order to save their empire, they had to overcome their deep prejudices and unite with the Latins to repulse the common enemy, the Turk. He was ahead of the Latins as well, since the west would not really begin to interest itself in the fate of the east until the Turks had approached so close as to begin to threaten the western European territories.
94. PG, CLl, cols. 1332 ff.; Viller, 4iLa Question de Punion," RHE, XVIII, 22-23; also C. Giannelli, **Un Projetto di Barlaam per Tunione delle chiese," Misc. Giovanni Mercati, III (Studie testi, 123; Vatican City, 1946), 171 and note 22.
95. VUler,op. cit., RHE, XVIII, 23, quoting Niccphorus Gregoras, X, 8 (CSHB, 1,501); PG, CXLVIII, col. 717.
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In the end the discussions failed, and Barlaam and his companion returned empty-handed to Byzantium. In his pourparlers Barlaam had emphasized that the Greeks, if they learned of the papal refusal to attend a general council, would accuse the Latins of being afraid of the truth.96 And exactly as he had foreseen, the Greeks, espe- cially Gregoras, turned against the pope his refusal to meet at a common council. Indeed, only a few decades later the influential Nilus Cabasilas, Greek metropolitan of Thessalonica, in his works On the Causes of the Division of the Church and On the Primacy of the Pope, would insist that one of the two basic causes for the schism was this very refusal of the pope to submit controversial doctrine to the judgment of a general council.97
For several years following Andronicus's death in 1341 Byzantium was again the scene of civil war, this time between the usurper John Cantacuzenus and the widow of Andronicus III, the Latin empress Anna of Savoy, who sought to protect the rights of her minor son John V. If we can believe the testimony of Anna's bitter enemy, the emperor-historian Cantacuzenus, Anna during this civil strife (on October 21, 1343) dispatched to pope Clement VI an ambassador, the Latin Philip of St. Germain, bearing letters from her and from her minister the grand duke Alexius Apocaucus.98 Expressing her devotion and that of her son to the Roman church, she asked the pope's mercy (elaion) for the "heresies" of the Greeks and pleaded for the dispatch of a fleet and army to defend Constantinople from the usurper John Cantacuzenus. The latter adds in his history that she affirmed to the pope that after the defeat of Cantacuzenus negotiations for religious union could openly (phaneros) be entered into. Clement responded favorably to her advances without however promising support other than in general terms.99 Whether Anna at this time envisaged the launching of a full-scale "crusade" on her own behalf is doubtful; rather, in the Byzantine tradition, she too seems to have intended the dispatch of mercenary troops.100
96. Viller.op. cit., RHE, XVIII, 24.
97. PG, CXLIX, cols. 684 ff. Cf. L. Petit, "Les feveques de Thessalonique," £chos d Orknt,V (1901), 94.
98. Not all scholars agree that she sent letters to the pope; Iorga, "Latins et grecs d 'Orient et Pe'tablissement des Turcs en Europe (1342-1362)," Byzantinische Zeitschrift, XV (1906), 183, accepts that she did.
99. Cantacuzenus, III, 87 (CSHB, II, 539-540); see Lemerle, L'tmirat d'Aydin, p. 183, for careful analysis.
100. There is a question here of "false*' letters written by Anna's minister Apocaucus against the regent Cantacuzenus and borne secretly to Gement VI by a certain praipositos (Lemerle, L'imirat d'Aydin, p. 183, note 1).
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Whether or not we accept Cantacuzenus's statement that Anna had no scruples whatever in making promises to the pope, her sending an envoy to the pope seems only logical, given her hard-pressed situa- tion. From Clement's correspondence with Anna, we may sense the illusions that were entertained at Avignon regarding the Greeks. Even before Anna's approach to the pope she had sent still another ambassador to Venice, seeking military aid against the Turks. Re- sponding to her letter on May 12, 1343, the senate declared that Venice would do its best to aid her and that in fact a new anti- Turkish league composed of Cyprus, the Hospitallers, and king Rob- ert of Naples was then in process of formation under the auspices of the pope. Anna's envoy also asked that Venice intervene with Ste- phen Dushan, ruler of the Serbs, to enlist his aid against Cantacu- zenus. Again Venice reacted favorably, the senate designating a Venetian, Marino Venier, to accomplish the mission. 101
Meanwhile Clement VI, reacting to Anna's proposals for religious union in exchange for aid against Cantacuzenus, sent out a series of individual letters, all looking toward the end of the schism. One was dispatched to Anna's crafty minister, Apocaucus, another to all the Greek bishops, still others to the monks of Mount Athos, to the commune of Pera, to the Venetian bailie in Constantinople, and finally to the Franciscan and Dominican convents in Pera. All were invited to aid the apostolic delegate in the task set before him. 102 On October 27, 1343, Clement wrote again to Apocaucus, announc- ing to him that he was looking forward to the end of schism and that the Catholic confessor who was to be chosen by Apocaucus himself would have the power in the name of the pope to remit all of his (Apocaucus's) sins 103 -as if this "concession" mentioned by the pope would have been a spur to Apocaucus, who was, if anything, even wilier than other Byzantines of the period! A few days later, on November 15, 1343, the pope also wrote to Demetrius Palaeologus, a relative of the emperor, encouraging his zeal in favor of the Roman faith. In this case, however, the pope prudently charged the Genoese podesta, the Dominican abbot, and the commune of Pera to work on
101. Ibid., pp. 182-183. On August 8, 1343, Clement VI announced to Venice the formation of a new league -to include the Hospitallers, Cyprus, and himself-and requested Venice to contribute five or six galleys (a total of twenty ships were to meet at Negroponte but Euboea, Melos, and Paros were to furnish their own contingents). The Byzantine emperor rallied to this later; the league was to last three years. Meanwhile Genoa, Pisa, and Aragon loaned vessels to the pope (see loTga, Philippe de Me'zieres, p. 40).
102. Lemerle, L'£mirat d'Aydin, p. 183.
103. E. D6prez, ed., Clement VI (1342-1352): Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant a la France .... fasc. 1 (Paris, 1901), no. 493, and cf. nos. 467, 491.
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Demetrius in order to keep him well disposed to the question of union. 104
Evidence indicates that Clement was sincere in his desire for union with the eastern church. Thus in the letters he wrote to the titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople, Henry of Asti, then in residence at Negroponte, to the Dominicans of Pera, and even to the Venetian and Genoese colonies of Constantinople, the pope urged them to exert every effort to prepare for the union. 105 His unionist enthusi- asm notwithstanding, Clement nevertheless demonstrated precisely the same point of view as his papal predecessors in his insistence that the sending of military aid to Constantinople must be contingent on the eastern church's prior abjuration of the schism.
In the same year (1343), and probably even before receiving the appeal contained in Anna's letter, Clement authorized the preaching throughout western Europe of a crusade against the Turks. 106 For this purpose he made plans for the reorganization of the old naval league which had been formed in 1334 at the instance of pope John XXII. This was the first step in the initiation of the famous crusade against the important Turkish-held port of Smyrna in Asia Minor. For such an enterprise it would have been logical for Clement to seek adhesion to the coalition by Byzantium, that is, by its regent Anna of Savoy. 107 It is clear, however, that Byzantium took no active part in the expedition that was soon launched. Actually the aim of the campaign was twofold: to crush the growing menace of the Sel- chiikid principality of Aydin, of which Smyrna was the chief port, and to suppress the resurgent Turkish piracy in the Aegean, for which Smyrna was the primary base. At the head of the papal galleys Clement placed the Genoese lord Martin Zaccaria. From the Byzan- tine view this was an affront, since he hated the Byzantines, who had expelled him in 1329 from his possession of Chios. 108 As supreme commander of the entire expeditionary force, however, the pope appointed the patriarch Henry of Asti, 109 who had strict orders not to permit the deflection of the expedition to any other objective.
104. Ibid., nos. 522-523; cf. Lemerle, L'&mirat d'Aydin, p. 183, note 2.
105. See Lemerle, he. cit., and Cantacuzenus, he. cit.
106. A papal bull authorizing contributions for a crusade was launched on September 30, 1343 (Iorga, "Latins et grecs," p. 189; Philippe de Mizieres, pp. 40 ff.).
107. In 1343, during negotiations with Anna, the Dominican Philip Incontri of Pera (Kaepelli, "Deux nouveaux ouvrages," pp. 172-173) wrote the pope that the crusading forces being prepared for Smyrna should make a demonstration before Constantinople and that the recalcitrant people would then obey Anna.
108. Iorga considers his appointment a mistake ("Latins et grecs," pp. 190-191).
109. Lemerle, L'£mirat d'Aydin, p. 187. Iorga ("Latins et grecs/' pp. 192 ff.) errs in
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John Cantacuzenus was the ally of the Selchukid emir of Aydin, Umur Pasha, and it was therefore to the interest of Anna and her court at Constantinople to spur Clement in every way possible to a crusade against Smyrna. 110 We shall not enter here into the com- plexities of the campaign against Smyrna. In a preliminary naval battle the Turks are supposed to have lost as many as fifty ships. 111 Martin Zaccaria, the papal naval commander, who hated Canta- cuzenus, would have liked to use the papal galleys in the reoccupa- tion of Chios, which he contended could be used to advantage as a base against Smyrna. The pope, however, refused his suggestion, not only because it was contrary to the original plans but more especially on the grounds that it would compromise the hope for reunion of the Greeks with Rome and might even push the Greeks into an alliance with the Turks.
The crusading expedition to Smyrna had been long and secretly prepared, and the Turks of Umur were taken by surprise. Canta- cuzenus had gotten wind of the expedition, but the letter he wrote from Demotica to his ally Umur apprising him of the western advance came too late. 112 His letter reveals that in the Greek east, in any case, the preparations of the west for the crusade were known. The expedition remained purely Latin, however, there being no record that Byzantine ships— those of Anna— participated. 113 Canta- cuzenus of course was considered an enemy by the Latins. After some fighting, the western fleet finally took the port area of Smyrna, and the town itself, but the Turks continued for many years to hold a fort situated high on a nearby hill, commanding the city. 114 Thus the crusade was not yet over, for the crusaders in the city, who were under pressure from the Turks in the fort, had to be relieved, and an
preferring Peter Thomas, on whom see the biography by Philip of Mezieres edited by Smet, and the studies by Iorga and Boehlke cited in the bibliographical note.
110. On Byzantium and the league of 1343, see Iorga, Philippe de Mizidres, p. 40, notes 6, 7; Raynaldus, Annates ecclesiastici, ad ann. 1344, no. 2; and Heyd, Histoire du com- merce, I, 383. For works on the crusade to Smyrna, see Gay, Climent VI; Iorga, "Latins et grecs," pp. 179-222; Chevalier, La Croisade du dauphin Humbert II; Iorga, Philippe de Mdzieres, pp. 33-62; Delaville Le Roulx, La France en Orient, pp. 103-1 10; C. Faure, "Le Dauphin Humbert II a Venise et en Orient (1345-1347)," Melanges d'archiologie et d'histoire, XXVII (1907), 509-562; Lemerle, L'imirat d 'Aydin, pp. 187 ff. Also seeB.T. Goryanov, "An Anonymous Unpublished Byzantine Chronicle of the Fourteenth Century" [in Russian], Vizantiiskii Vremennik, II (1949), 276-293.
111. Atiya, Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, p. 293. On these events cf. Nicephorus Gregoras, XIII, 13 (CSHB, II, 689), and Cantacuzenus, III, 68 (CSHB, II, 420-423).
112. Lemerle, L 'imirat d 'Aydin, p. 1 86.
113. Although the absence of affirmative evidence cannot be considered conclusive proof of Byzantine non-participation, other considerations make such participation improbable.
114. Atiya, op. cit., pp. 294-298.
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adequate permanent garrison installed. Moreover, the pope had addi- tional plans in mind; he intended, it seems, to strengthen the league by securing more troops. At the same time he sought to assist the Genoese in defending their colony of Kaffa in the Crimea, which was being invested by the Tatars.
At this critical juncture for the Latin states in the east, there came onto the scene a man who was to remain at the center of events for some years, the western noble Humbert II, dauphin of Viennois. He was imbued with the old crusading spirit and fervor but was incompe- tent as a military commander, a fact which was to result in the ultimate failure of the crusade. Humbert had taken the cross at Avignon and had been named by the pope captain-general of the apostolic see and chief of the army of the Christians against the Turks. 115 Recent scholarship has shown that a supposed victory on his part over the Turks at the Greek island of Lesbos in full winter at the start of February 1346 is mere legend. 116 At any rate, in June of 1346 he finally arrived before Smyrna. Regarding the events which followed, western accounts differ remarkably and Byzantine sources offer little help. 117 We shall concentrate here only on those events which involved or had a direct influence on the Byzantines. After leaving Smyrna, having accomplished nothing, and while spending the winter of 1346-1347 at Rhodes, Humbert wrote to Clement at Avignon. In his response the pope made the very firm point that, despite Hum- bert's request for papal permission to intervene on behalf of Anna against Cantacuzenus, he did not feel it to be proper, certainly not until the treaty with the Turks had been concluded. 118 Clement's remark reveals his sensitivity to the delicate power balance in the east, especially his desire to keep on good terms with both sides so as not to destroy any prospect for union.
The commander of the Venetian fleet in the crusade of Humbert, Nicholas Pisani, had in the meantime gone with a companion to the court of Constantinople in an attempt to persuade the empress Anna
115. Lemerle, L'Emirat d'Aydin, p. 194, note 3, remarks that on these events Atiya (op. cit., pp. 303-318) is insufficiently critical. Humbert sought command of this crusade, offering troops and 1,000 arbalesters (Iorga, Philippe deMizieres, p. 45, note 3).
116. Lemerle, L'tmirat d'Aydin, pp. 195-196, on the basis of Storie pistoresi, ed. S. A. Barbi, in Muratori, RISS, XI, pt. 5 (Bologna, 1627; rev. ed. 1907-1927); cf. C. Faure, "Le Dauphin Humbert II," p. 529.
117. Lemerle uses here a new Turkish source on Umur, the Diisturname of Enveri, published as Le Destan d'UmGr Pacha, ed. and trans. I. Melikoff-Sayar (Bibliotheque byzantine, documents, no. 2; Paris, 1954).
118. Lemerle, L'imirat d'Aydin, pp. 199-201, note 1: the pope instructed Humbert to lie off Constantinople and not to interfere in the civil war between Cantacuzenus and Anna.
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to cede, temporarily, to the crusader forces the adjacent island of Chios as a base of operations against the Turks. 119 Evidently the tension between the Greeks of Anna's party and the Latins had slackened somewhat and the possibility of an anti-Turkish entente between east and west had grown stronger. Clement's letter to Anna, 120 dated June 15, 1346, seems in any case to give this impression. Any such possibility was, however, quashed by the Genoese, who coveted Chios in the interests of their own trade. And so the Genoese in the same year dispatched a fleet to Chios and seized it from the Greeks for themselves. The Greeks, as well as the Venetians and the other western powers involved in Humbert's expedition, were angered.121
It is noteworthy that while Humbert was in the east he made attempts to treat with the Greeks personally on the problem of ecclesiastical union. The talks appear to have been of little conse- quence, however. And soon afterward, irritated by the constant bickering of his Latin allies, Humbert sought and received permission from the pope to retire from the crusading expedition. 122 This ended any actual or potential connection of Byzantium with the ill-fated crusade. Nevertheless, Humbert's interest in the Greek east seems to have been long-lasting, for on his return to France in the summer of 1347 (he entered a Dominican convent) he set up scholar- ships at the University of Paris, many of which he reserved for young men belonging by birth to Greece and the Holy Land. These men were to teach Greek in the Dominican convents of France and do missionary work in the east. 123 Despite his keen interest in the Levant, however, Humbert was out of step with his age. A genuine idealist, he would have been more at home in the crusades of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. His inability to act indepen- dently and the lack of scruple exhibited by the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa brought his crusading efforts to nothing. Never- theless, he is one of the first examples of a western layman who, as a result of personal contact with the east, encouraged the study of Greek in a Latin university and who took a special interest in missionary activity. With respect to the problem of the crusade, though, the whole expedition of Humbert was futile; its primary
119. Atiya.op. cit., p. 311.
120. Letter of Clement commending the crusaders to Anna: see Gay, CUment VI, pp. 70-71, and Atiya,op. cit., pp. 311-312.
121. Nicephorus Gregoras, XV, 6 (CSHB, II, 765-767; PG, CXLVIII, col. 1005);Canta- cuzenus, III, 95 (CSHB. II, 582-583;/^, CLIII, col. 1269).
122. Iorga, "Latins et grecs pp. 202-204.
123. Atiya.op. cit., p. 317.
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importance lay in its indication that the pope and the western church were finally ready to regard an expedition to Asia Minor as a genuine crusade. The attention of the west had thus definitely shifted from the Mamluk Turks of Egypt and Syria to the Ottomans and other Turks of Asia Minor. For the Byzantines the expedition was impor- tant because as a result of it they had lost Chios and Phocaea to the Genoese. Nevertheless, since the Greeks were the principal victims of the Turks in that area, prospects were now brighter for the formation of a joint Byzantine-Latin front against the Turks. From such a coalition the Byzantines would naturally derive the chief profit.
After a prolonged civil war John Cantacuzenus was finally able to crush the party of Anna and on February 3, 1347, to return vic- torious to Constantinople. He then established himself and young John V as co-emperors. The civil war, so destructive to the Byzantine state territorially, economically, and morally, was temporarily ended. During the conflict Cantacuzenus had taken an action which at the time did not seem fraught with real danger for the Greeks. In the winter of 1344-1345 John Cantacuzenus, after obtaining the approv- al of his close friend and ally Umur, emir of Aydin, had sought an alliance with his former enemy Orkhan, the Ottoman emir of Bi- thynia. This new alliance Cantacuzenus sealed with the marriage of his daughter Theodora to the sexagenarian Orkhan. It was Orkhan's assistance that helped to produce his triumph over the Latin-oriented party of Anna. But it is important to note that as a result of the new alliance between Orkhan and Cantacuzenus the Ottomans, as Canta- cuzenus's mercenaries, were now for the first time brought across the Dardanelles into Europe. 124
Cantacuzenus was nonetheless worried over the reaction of the pope and the western rulers to his alliance with the Ottomans. Indeed, after his triumphal entrance into Constantinople he confided his apprehensions to Bartholomew of Rome, former vicar of the Latin patriarch, who had previously been sent by Humbert to Anna. Evidence is to be found in two letters sent by Bartholomew at this time or soon after to pope Clement VI and Humbert, from which it may be inferred that Cantacuzenus informed him that he intended not only to reestablish the union of the churches but even to fight on the side of the papacy against the Turks. 125 But Cantacuzenus was a Byzantine in the convoluted diplomatic tradition of Michael VIII, and so he at the same time continued to maintain his relationship
124. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 463-464.
125. Cantacuzenus, IV, 2 {CSHB, III, 12-20); cf. Lemerle, U&mirat d'Aydin, p. 224.
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with Orkhan, which was of use to him in his conflict against the Serbs.
Our knowledge of the negotiations between John VI Cantacuzenus and Clement was formerly derived only from John's own history, which is certainly biased and often chronologically confused. But information from documents published recently enables us to see the drift of Cantacuzenus's negotiations with the papacy. In meetings held in Constantinople (September 1 to October 9, 1347) before the emperor, between Bartholomew of Rome and John's three ambas- sadors—the protovestiarius George Spanopulus, the official Nicholas Sigerus, and the Latin knight from Auvergne, Francis du Pertuis- Cantacuzenus recognized "the primacy and universality of the Ro- man church" and engaged himself to observe toward Rome the same obedience as the king of France. 126 So what the Greek emperor had so long feared might now come to pass. Cantacuzenus would, accord- ing to this affirmation, be regarded as simply another ruler subservi- ent (like those of the west) to the pope. In order to end the schism he proposed the calling of a council to be held in a maritime city situated halfway between Constantinople and Avignon. 127 While requesting that the pope intervene with the Serbian ruler Stephen Dushan, who had "unjustly" occupied Greek territories, Canta- cuzenus offered to participate personally in a crusade against the Turks, 128 evidently even against his own ally, the emir of Aydin. In another letter (March 5, 1348), John repeated his earlier offers and for a crusade proposed to furnish either four thousand men or fifteen to twenty thousand, depending on whether the west at this time envisaged only a parvum passagium with a limited objective or a full-scale crusade (generate et magnum sanctum passagium). 129
Clement quickly acknowledged reception of Cantacuzenus's em- bassy, but, well informed as to the situation in the east, he was apparently suspicious of Cantacuzenus's motives and thus gave only a vague answer to his proposals. Indeed, a considerable period was to elapse before Clement in turn dispatched representatives to Constan- tinople, with instructions to begin negotiations for union. What is important in all these complex negotiations is that Cantacuzenus had made a secret, solemn commitment to fight in person with all his forces against the Turks, even against his old ally Umur, the emir of Aydin.
126. R. J. Loenertz, "Ambassadeurs grecs aupres du pape Clement VI (1348)," Orientalia Christiana periodica, XIX (1953), 180-184;cf. Lemerle , Vtmirat d' 'Aydin, p. 225.
127. Loenertz, be. cit.; also Pears, Destruction of the Greek Empire, p. 83.
128. Cantacuzenus, IV, 9 {CSHB, III, 53-62).
129. Loenertz, op. cit., pp. 178-196; cf. Gay, Cldment VI, pp. 104 ff.
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More important from the papal side, Clement reacted favorably to the suggestion for the calling of a council. This was the first time in centuries that a pope had agreed to this condition of the Greeks. The way was now open not only for a full-scale east-west crusade to eject the common enemy from Asia Minor but, no less significant, for the holding of an ecumenical council which could finally and irrevocably unite the long-separated churches. Once more, however, the time was not propitious. The disruptive situation in the east, the turmoil in France and England of the Hundred Years' War, and the perennial internal troubles of Italy, not to speak of the devastation sown throughout all of Europe in 1348 by the Black Death-at least one third of the entire population of Byzantium and the west perished of plague-conspired to delay any such cooperation. Negotiations, nev- ertheless, continued between the papacy and Byzantium, to be terminated only in 1352 with the death of Clement. 130
For the west, all that remained of the complex campaigns and negotiations connected with the crusade to Smyrna was the Latin occupation of the port. The Greeks, on the other hand, who had technically stood aloof, gained little or nothing. Indeed, they had lost the important island of Chios, and Phocaea as well. Nevertheless, later in the fourteenth century, the famous Byzantine scholar and statesman Demetrius Cydones, seeking to emphasize to his country- men the advantages of a new Greco-Latin alliance, would point back to the Latin possession of Smyrna as an example of the efficacy of Latin military intervention in the east. 131
A direct result of the Latin possession of Smyrna was an embassy sent to the pope in 1352, shortly before Clement's death, by the Greek inhabitants of the Anatolian city of Philadelphia. In this embassy, which was received by Clement's successor Innocent VI, the Greeks sought succor from the pope against the persecutions of the Turkish emirates, which had now completely encircled their city. Papal sponsorship of the expedition at Smyrna must have made a considerable impression on the population of Philadelphia. For in exchange for papal protection the Philadelphians sought to place themselves and their city, in perpetuity, under the hegemony of the pope "in all that concerns temporal affairs (ad temporalia)" that is, to become "vassals" of the pope but without abandoning their
130. Gay, Climent VI, pp. 107 ff.; Lemerle, Vtmirat d'Ayd in, pp. 226 ff.
131. When Cydones later urged the Byzantines to accept the aid of Amadeo VI of Savoy, he reminded them of the effectiveness of Latin aid at Smyrna Q*G, CLIV, col. 981; Loenertz, Les Recueils de lettres de De'me'trius Cydones, Vatican City, 1 947, pp. 1 1 1-1 1 2). Cydones says the Greeks reaped the profit (kerdos) of the Latin sacrifices in the taking of Smyrna.
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Orthodox faith. Innocent VI, with rather unwarranted severity, wrote back to Philadelphia emphasizing his demand that its people should first abandon the schism and recognize the primacy of the Roman church "in order to avoid eternal punishment, which is something much graver than the peril of the Turk." Once this was done, he affirmed, God would imbue them with enough strength so that one man alone could triumph over a thousand Turks. After abjuration of the schism let them (the Philadelphians) send new envoys, after which the pope in turn would dispatch Latin theo- logians to instruct them, and perhaps one day he could also aid them to secure victory. 132 The pope's answer seems to us today rather callous in view of the near-desperate situation of the city. In any event, this dramatic plea of Greek citizens to the pope from a city in far-off Asia Minor, though in itself not of much importance, enables us to see with great clarity the dilemma of the Greeks-desperate in their need for military aid but at the same time unwilling to accept the western demand to relinquish their traditional faith, a faith which to them was their mark of identity. How much more severe the punishment of God would be, they must have thought, were they voluntarily to give up the purity of their own faith in exchange for papal aid.
The installation of Cantacuzenus on the Byzantine throne, 133 besides ending the civil war, had still another result: it confirmed the triumph of the hesychastic movement. Hesychasm, which empha- sized a kind of spiritual union of man and God already in this life, had been flourishing mainly among the monks of Mount Athos, and at the council in 1356 it was proclaimed as official Orthodox doctrine. The entire empire had been drawn into the religious discus- sion over hesychasm. One side, the anti-hesychasts, are sometimes viewed as representing the Latinophile outlook; 134 Barlaam was their spokesman, while Gregoras had come forward as the leader of the hesychastic, pro-nationalist outlook. In contrast to Michael VIII, who was considered sympathetic to the Latins, Andronicus II and John VI may be considered as proponents of the Orthodox, more conservative outlook.
This period of struggle between rival claimants to the Byzantine throne permitted the rise to power of the Serbian ruler Stephen Dushan. Assuming the imperial title itself-he styled himself "emper-
132. On the exchange of letters, see Lemerle, Vtmirat d'Aydin, pp. 236-237.
133. Cantacuzenus evidently used German mercenaries (I, 20; CSHB, 1, 98).
134. Not always justifiably, as the division between pro- Latin and anti-Latin did not invariably correspond to the beliefs for and against hesychasm; see, for example, J. Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palomas, trans. George Lawrence (London, 1964), p. 16.
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or of the Serbs and Greeks"- Stephen conquered almost the whole of Macedonia (except Thessalonica), Albania, Epirus, Thessaly, and other areas. At the end Dushan had control of more than half of the old Byzantine territories. 135 He lacked Constantinople, but for its capture he needed a fleet. Nevertheless, despite all his blandishments in their direction the Venetians, whose fleet he coveted, did not intend to see the weak Byzantine empire replaced with a strong Serbian power.
Conditions in other spheres also worsened for Byzantium. At sea the Genoese, as we have seen, had recaptured Chios in 1 346, and the Byzantine naval power, which had revived under Andronicus III and been further strengthened by Cantacuzenus at heavy cost, was de- stroyed. Hemmed in at sea between Venice and Genoa, two enemies constantly at war in Greek waters, Byzantium had now sunk to a pitiful state, while on land she was defeated and humiliated by the Ottomans and the Serbs. Even worse was the economic status of the empire: Byzantine trade was ruined (most! of it being usurped by the Genoese of Galata), the population was in no position to pay taxes, agriculture was in a state of ruin, and the value of the hyperper (hyperpyron) itself was diminishing daily. The depths to which the Byzantine state had sunk are almost unbelievable.
In the dissolution of the Byzantine empire in this last century of its life the effects of the constant Venetian-Genoese wars should not be underestimated. Ensconced in Galata, across from Constantinople, the Genoese, formerly the allies of Michael VIII Palaeologus, were able to interfere frequently in Byzantine affairs, especially when their extensive trading privileges were affected. But this brought them into constant collision with their rivals, the Venetians, who controlled Modon and Coron in the Morea, Euboea, and especially the islands of the southern Aegean. Of course the antagonists in this intense commercial rivalry took no note of the weakening effect it had on Byzantium and of the opportunity it offered the Turks. All was subordinate to the profits that could be extracted from the corpse of Byzantium. Cantacuzenus struggled against the Genoese as the more dangerous of the two rivals, but the empire could not free itself from the Genoese yoke. 136 A war broke out over Genoese attempts to block the passage of foreign-especially Venetian -vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosporus into the Black Sea, particu-
135. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, pp. 466 ff. In 1354 Dushan sent to Avignon offering his submission to Rome if the pope would name him captain-general against the Turks; nothing came of this (Iorga, "Latins et grecs," p. 21 7).
136. Ostrogorsky, Byzantine State, p. 471. Cantacuzenus had converted the Byzantine part of the Morea into a semi-autonomous despotate.
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larly to the port of Kaffa. Aragon, Venice, Genoa, and indirectly Orkhan were all involved, the only result being the further humilia- tion of Byzantium and a Byzantine promise to cede to Venice the island of Tenedos.
All this was rendered even more complicated by the renewal of the civil war between John Vl Cantacuzenus and the legitimate emperor, his son-in-law John V jPalaeologus. Sentiment in Constantinople began to favor the legitimate dynasty, especially after the advance of the Ottoman Turks across the Dardanelles and their seizure of Gallipoli. The population of Constantinople was seized by panic and the position of the usurper Cantacuzenus became untenable. The prominent scholar-statesirjan of the period Demetrius Cydones testi- fies that lamentations resounded throughout Constantinople as the citizens wailed, "Are not all of us within the walls caught as if in the net of the barbarians?" 13* John V, meanwhile, to secure Genoese support, had promised them the Greek island of Lesbos, and in November 1354, with Geflbese help, the partisans of John V were able to force their way into* Constantinople. Compelled to abdicate, John Cantacuzenus entered a monastery and thenceforth took no further part in politics, speeding his last years writing his famous history and theological traces defending hesychasm. The Byzantine empire seemed on the verge c|f complete collapse.
137. PG, CUV, col. 1013.
Digitized by
Ill
BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES, 1354-1453
T fith the retirement of John VI Cantacuzenus in 1354, John V Palaeologus ruled alone. He did not underestimate the gravity of the situation, and like his predecessor, soon after his accession made an attempt to save the empire by the usual device of seeking western aid. Half-Latin himself, and inspired by his mother Anna of Savoy with what seems to have been a certain devotion to the Latin church, he set to work to bring about religious union. On December 15, 1355, one year after his accession, he sent Innocent VI at Avignon a very detailed but surprisingly naive letter containing a series of astounding proposals for the effecting of union.1 To begin with, he requested the pope to aid in the defense of Constantinople by sending five galleys and fifteen transport vessels with a thousand foot soldiers and five hundred horsemen. All these were to be placed under the command of the emperor, but their expenses for six months were to be borne by the pope. In exchange John committed himself to some remarkable concessions. He pledged to convert his subjects within six months to the faith of Rome. To convince the pope that he would carry out the terms promised, he offered remark- ably far-reaching guarantees, more than the direst need of any empire could justify on the part of its ruler. First of all John promised to receive the papal legates with respect and accord them the authority to appoint to ecclesiastical benefices in Constantinople whomever they wished. To disseminate a knowledge of Latin culture the papal ambassadors would be permitted to found colleges in Constantinople for the teaching of Latin.2 John even promised to send his second
For bibliography, see preceding chapter.
1. See Halecki, Un Empereur de Byzance, pp. 17 ff. and 31 ff., who probably over- emphasizes the significance of negotiations with the pope under Cantacuzenus (Gay, Climent VI, pp. Ill ff. is more reserved); see also Viller, "La Question de l'union," RHE, XVIII, 26 ff. On John's letter to the pope, see Halecki, loc. cit.
2. During the Latin occupation of Constantinople the Latin emperor had sought to found a Latin college in Constantinople, but the papacy and especially the University of Paris had blocked it. But events had so changed that crusader theoreticians like Raymond Lull and
69
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A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES
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son Manuel, then a child of seven, to the papal court to be educated by the pope in the Latin faith. The emperor went so far as to pledge that, should these promises for some reason not be fulfilled, he would himself abdicate the throne. In that case control of the empire would be left to the papal ward, Manuel, or if he were still a minor, to the pope.3
Not surprisingly, Innocent replied enthusiastically to this astonish- ing letter. No less understandably, he apparently had some reserva- tions about the seriousness of the proposals, for in his reply he made no reference to anything specific; rather, in general but warm terms, he praised the imperial sentiments. At the same time he wrote letters to the Byzantine patriarch Callistus and to the principal Greek bishops, while dispatching two nuncios to Constantinople, one of them the famous Carmelite Peter Thomas.4 Though the pope him- self was guarded in his approach, news of the proposals was received in other western quarters with distrust mixed with gratification. Characteristically, Philip of M6zi6res, a propagandist for the crusade in the court of king Peter of Cyprus, wrote, "The news of John V's desire for conversion was very difficult to believe, because it had been so long that the Greeks were separated from the church, and because in previous negotiations they had so often deceived the Roman church.*'5
Wishing nevertheless to capitalize on the opportunity offered, Innocent made overtures to Venice, Genoa, the king of Cyprus, and the Hospitallers of Rhodes in order to secure ships, to send to Constantinople, but he failed in his efforts. No one would furnish the contingents requested; papal plans were also set back by the hostil- ities of the Venetian-Hungarian war. As for the Byzantine emperor, seeing no help forthcoming from Rome, he was obliged to write to Innocent that he was in no position to win the Greek populace over to his policy,6 since their inherent suspicions were now magnified by the west's failure to send military aid. Negotiations for union were ended for several years.
Yet the case for Greco-Latin rapprochement found its defenders also in the west. And the thought planted in the mind of the pope by
William Adam now sought to "Latinize" the Greeks, forcibly or otherwise, by compelling many to learn Latin (Geanakoplos, Byzantine East and Latin West, p. 2, note 3, and p. 103, note 74).
3. Halecki,op. ext., pp. 31 ff.
4. Iorga, Philippe de Mizikres, pp. 137-138; at Constantinople Peter Thomas instructed John in the Catholic faith.
5. Smet, Life of Saint Peter Thomas, p. 74.
6. Iorga, loc. cit.
Ch. Ill
BYZANTIUM AND THE CRUSADES, 1354-1453
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young John V bore fruit in the pope's dispatch again to Constan- tinople, in 1361, of the Latin archbishop of Crete, Peter Thomas, to look more carefully into the question of a possible union. Peter had lived for years in the east and, experienced in its problems, was a most suitable person to entrust with the delicate task of converting the Greeks to Catholicism.7
John V listened patiently to the arguments of the papal nuncio and showed signs of willingness to accept the creed of Rome. According to Philip of M6zieres, John was even ready to depose the incumbent anti-unionist patriarch of Constantinople, Callistus, and replace him with a Catholic ("patriarcham Graecum perfidum, et unitatis Eccle- siae inimicum promisit deponi et unum alium Catholicum eligi debere").8 In spite of the favorable motives of both pope and emperor the mission seems to have come to nothing. Though it was clearer than ever that any efforts to obtain western aid could succeed only as a result of papal influence, the difficulty was that, as a consequence of its experience at Lyons, the papacy always de- manded as a precondition that military aid follow the Greek abjura- tion of schism. On their side, the Greeks, reversing these conditions, insisted that aid should be sent before conversion as a sign of papal good faith. An impasse accordingly resulted in which each side waited for the first long step to be taken by the other. Of course what blocked even an initial advance was the suspicion underlying the attitude of each side. Contributory too was the rapid succession of popes, each one having to assess the situation anew for himself before he would act. There was also a misunderstanding in the west regarding the efficacy of imperial power. For in the west, where the Byzantine emperor was-erroneously-believed to have complete power over church and state (Caesaropapism, that is), the fact that he was unable, as we have seen, to force union on his recalcitrant clergy and people was usually misinterpreted as insincerity on his part.9 Barlaam's words quoted above are especially appropriate here.
In the mid-fourteenth century, under the shadow of the Ottoman
7. Another example besides Peter Thomas, who died in 1396 as titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople, is his predecessor Paul of Smyrna; also the archbishop of Thebes, Simon Atumano. See G. Mercati, Simone Atumano arcivescovo di Tebe (Studi e testi, 30; Rome, 1916); K. M. Setton, "The Byzantine Background to the Italian Renaissance," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, C (1956), 51; and G. Fedalto, Simone Atumano, monaco di studio, arcivescovo latino di Tebe (secolo XIV) (Brescia, 1968).
8. Philip of Mezieres, Vita S. Petri Thomasii, p. 616 (Acta Sanctorum, III [Paris, 1863) , 605 ff.); Atiya,op. cit., p. 132.
9. Geanakoplos, "Church and State in the Byzantine Empire and the Problem of Caesaro- papism," in his Byzantine East and Latin West, pp. 57 ff., and "The Council of Florence and the Problem of Union . . . ibid., p. 94, note 41.
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advance, two parties emerged in Byzantium with different views as to the source of succor against the Turks. The overwhelming majority of the masses and the clergy, always steadfastly Orthodox, were against any rapprochement with the Latins. The opposing party, the chief spokesman of which was the grand logothete, the scholar Demetrius Cydones, looked to the west as the only effective source for aid against the Turks. In this view the Christians of both east and west should unite in a common front against the "infidel" Turk.10 For the salvation of the state they were willing, though reluctantly, to pay the price of ecclesiastical subordination to Rome, the sine qua non of such an alliance.
The Orthodox party, however, had other ideas. It envisioned a pan-Orthodox coalition of the Balkan Slavic states against the Turks, a proposal which came to have no little appeal to many at this time. The policy came to the fore in 1355 when